Emissions trading and renewable jet fuel by McConnachie, D. (Dominic Alistair)
Climate Policy and the Airline Industry: Emissions Trading and Renewable Jet Fuel
By
Dominic A. T. McConnachie
B.Sc. Mechatronics Engineering
University of Cape Town, 2008
M.Sc. Cognitive Science
ENS, EHESS and Paris Descartes, 2010
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Technology and Policy at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 2012
C 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOYC
JUN 13 2012
L BRARIES
ARCHIVES
The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly
paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of author:
Engineering Systems Division
Technology and Policy Program
y16, 2012
Certified by:
nA. Waitz
D an of Engineering
Jerome C. Hunsaker Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by:
Joel P. Clark
P fe or of Materials Systems and Engineering Systems
Acting Director, Technology & Policy Program
1
[Page intentionally left blank]
2
Climate Policy and the Airline Industry: Emissions Trading and Renewable Jet Fuel
By
Dominic A. T. McConnachie
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division on May 16, 2012
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science in Technology and Policy
Abstract
In this thesis, I assess the impact of the current EU Emissions Trading Scheme and a hypothetical
renewable jet fuel mandate on US airlines. I find that both the EU Scheme up until 2020 and a
renewable jet fuel mandate of 1 bn gallons per year from 2018 to 2022 would have a small impact
on US airlines and emissions, and operations would continue to grow by -3% p.a.
I find that if carriers pass on all additional costs to consumers in the EU Scheme,
including the opportunity costs associated with free allowances, windfall gains may be substantial
at about $2.6bn because under current allocation rules, airlines would only have to purchase about
a third of the required allowances. However, an increase in the proportion of allowances
auctioned would reduce windfall gains and profits for US airlines would decline. If airlines pass
on only allowance expenses airlines do not receive windfall gains. Out-of-sector abatement is
estimated at about a third of airline emissions for the North Atlantic routes, compared to the
estimated 1.6% in-sector emissions reductions due largely to reductions in demand under the EU
Scheme. Under proposed EU legislation, airlines can use renewable jet fuel instead of purchasing
emissions allowances. I find that the current allowance price would make it cheaper for airlines to
purchase renewable jet fuel only under conditions where the renewable fuel price premium is 10
cents per gallon or less.
I find that a renewable jet fuel mandate of 1bn gallons per year for US commercial
aviation (about 4% of the total fuel use) with renewable jet fuel price premium of $1.50 would
increase airline fuel costs by ~2% and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by between 2% and 4%.
Emissions would continue to grow and reach approximate 2018 levels by 2022.
I use the social cost of carbon, with a baseline value of $100/tCO 2e, to calculate the
societal cost-effective price premium of renewable jet. I find that fuels can have a price premium
of between 40c and $1.30 per gallon, depending on life cycle greenhouse gas reduction.
Renewable jet fuels examined in this thesis, including the only commercially available fuel,
currently have price premiums of more than $2 per gallon and a calculated greenhouse gas
abatement cost of more than $250/tCO2e.
This thesis shows that the emerging renewable jet fuel industry needs to reduce costs to
achieve greenhouse gas abatement costs, and therefore societal benefits, comparable to the social
cost of carbon or EU allowance costs. It also shows that for the fuels examined with currently
estimated prices, the EU Scheme, and the now defunct Waxman-Markey Bill would be lower cost
options of greenhouse gas abatement for airlines than a renewable fuel mandate, and in any case
would not preclude the use of renewable fuels should they be produced with lower price
premiums.
Thesis Supervisor: Ian A Waitz
Title: Dean of Engineering, Jerome C. Hunsaker Professor of Aeronautics and
Astronautics
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Air transport currently accounts for a small but increasing proportion of greenhouse gas
emissions from human activity. In 2010 the air transport industry emitted 2% of global
carbon dioxide emissions (IATA, 2011). Between 1971 and 2009, air transport's carbon
dioxide emissions grew by 153% while global carbon dioxide emissions grew by 102%
(IEA, 2010)1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that by
2050 air transport carbon dioxide emissions will account for 3% of carbon dioxide
emissions from human activity (IPCC, 2007).
There is good evidence that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses will
change the earth's climate and pose risk to human and natural systems. The International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report in the Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report
that: "carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas", and conclude
that "there is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has
been one of warming" (IPCC, 2007). In the United States, the National Academy of
Sciences report that: "climate change is occurring, is very likely caused primarily by the
emission of greenhouse gases from human activities, and poses significant risks for a
range of human and natural systems" (NAS, 2011). Other scientific institutions agree. In
October 2009 the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and
seventeen other groups, including the American Geophysical Union and the American
Meteorological Society, wrote a letter to the United States Senate stating that:
"observations throughout the world make it clear that climate change is occurring, and
rigorous scientific research demonstrates that the greenhouse gases emitted by human
activities are the primary driver" and that "the severity of climate change impacts is
expected to increase substantially in the coming decades". (AAAS, 2006)
1In an analysis of 139 studies, Gillen et al. (2003) find that aviation has a median income elasticity demand
of 1.39.
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In the context of growing concern about climate change, there has been both
national and international discussion about reducing aviation's carbon dioxide emissions.
At the international level, the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) has
implemented industry goals to cap aviation carbon dioxide emissions from 2020 (carbon-
neutral growth), achieve an average improvement in fuel efficiency of 1.5% per year
from 2009 to 2020 and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 50% of 2005 levels by 2050
(IATA, 2009). In October 2010 the United Nation's International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) adopted resolution A37-19 (ICAO, 2010a) with similar aims to
IATAs. In 2008, the European Commission adopted directive 2008/101/EC, to include
aviation in the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), effective
January 1st 2012. Under the EU-ETS, all flights originating or departing from airports
within the EU, irrespective of carrier nationality, have to acquire allowances to cover
carbon dioxide emissions.
In the United States regulation pertaining to carbon dioxide emissions continues
to be controversial. Although the United States ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, no
president has either signed, or rejected, the protocol. However, the United States has seen
developments in terms of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Since January 2011, The
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has regulated greenhouse gas
emissions from certain stationary and mobile sources under the Clean Air Act. Likewise,
in June 2009 the House of Representatives approved The American Clean Energy and
Security Act, also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill. The bill would have established a
US emissions trading scheme. However, the bill did not pass a vote in the Senate
(H.R.2454, 2009). In 2011 the United States Federal Aviation Administration announced
Destination 2025 which includes the stated goal "...one billion gallons of renewable jet
fuel is used by aviation by 2018". (FAA, 2011)
While these regulations and goals are likely to be of great importance in reducing
aviation's carbon dioxide emissions, they may result in an effective increase in airline
fuel cost, and resulting decrease in airline operations, as shown by Malina et al. (2012)
and Winchester et al. (2011) for the EU-ETS and the Waxman-Markey Bill respectively.
Air transportation is vital to the global economy and so the impacts of such policy should
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be carefully considered. In 2010 ICAO member airlines2 carried 2.56 billion passengers
and 48 million tonnes of freight using 24,684 aircraft (ICAO, 2010b) serving 3750
airports and resulting in 33 million people being employed by the airline industry and
related tourism (ATAG, 2008). In 2007, the global air transport industry accounted for
7.5% of world GDP, or more than $3.5 trillion per year (ATAG, 2008). It is therefore
important to adopt regulation that will both reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and have as
little negative impact on air transport as possible. Given this background, in this thesis I
set out to explore and compare the impact of select climate legislation on the United
States aviation industry3 .
1.2 Research Approach
In this thesis I assess the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS) on US aviation. I also investigate the impacts of a hypothetical renewable jet fuel
mandate on US aviation as well as quantify the greenhouse gas abatement cost and
abatement cost goals of select renewable jet fuel pathways.
These three research threads are intended to stand independently. However, there
is much interaction and relevance between each section. The research is broken down
into four research questions:
Research Question 1: What is the impact of the EU-ETS on US aviation?
Research Question 2: What are the GHG abatement costs of renewable jet fuels?
Research Question 3: What is the impact of a hypothetical renewable jet fuel
mandate on US aviation?
Research Question 4: Is it currently cheaper for airlines to purchase renewable jet
fuel or emissions allowances in an emissions trading scheme?
A brief overview of research methodology follows. Chapter 2 addresses research question
1. The chapter research methodology follows Winchester et al. (2011) and Jost (2011).
An economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used in conjunction
with an airline partial equilibrium model. The CGE model is used to determine the
impact of the EU-ETS on fuel prices and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the partial
2 Comprising the vast majority of airline traffic with its 191 member countries.
3 I select the US aviation industry because this research was partly funded by the US Federal Aviation
Administration Office of Environment and Energy under FAA Award Number: 06-C-NE-MIT.
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equilibrium model is further developed and used to assess the impact of the EU-ETS on
US airlines. The chosen CGE model is the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis
(EPPA) model. The EPPA model is a recursive dynamic model of the global economy
that links GHG emissions to economic activity (Paltsev et al., 2005)4. I model the
aviation industry using the Aviation Environmental Portfolio Management Tool for
Economics (APMT-E). A Matlab and SQL script was written to connect EPPA and
APMT-E. The APMT tool suite is designed to assess the effects of aviation on the
environment, and APMT-E focuses on airline responses to policy changes. The model
has been used in support of International Civil Aviation Organization/Group on
International Aviation and Climate Change (2009) and International Civil Aviation
Organization/Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (2010) and is outlined by
MVA Consultancy (2009). In the model, airlines can respond to carbon dioxide costs by
raising prices (and flying less) and, when purchasing new aircraft, selecting more fuel
efficient alternatives. The model is calibrated using 2006 data from the Bureau of
Transport Statistics Form 41 PS2, ICAO and the Aviation Environmental Design Tool
(AEDT) based on the System for Assessing Aviation's Global Emissions or SAGE.
To investigate research question 2, renewable jet fuel abatement costs, I apply an
analytic relationships from the literature (CBO, 2010 and DEFRA, 2008), which I re-
derive for my purpose. Research question 3, the impacts of a mandate, is investigated
using a heuristic model and through a literature review and descriptive approach, and
research question 4 is investigated by combining results from previous sections.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
This thesis adds to an extensive literature on the environmental impacts of aviation, for
example Waitz et al. (2004) and IPCC (Penner et al., 1999). In terms of investigating the
impact of climate policy on aviation, Winchester et al. (2011), investigate the impact of
the Waxman-Markey Bill of US aviation. Although several authors have examined the
impact of the EU-ETS on aviation e.g., Anger (2010), Wit et al. (2005), Mayor and Tol
(2010), Vespermann and Wald (2010), Chapter 2 of this thesis adds to the literature by
4 Note that the EPPA model was modified and run by Niven Winchester and Chris Gillespie from the
Joint Program for the Science and Policy of Global Change at MIT.
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providing a focused analysis on US aviation, as well as adding a welfare economic
impact assessment. It also adds to the literature by quantifying when it is cost-effective
for airlines to purchase renewable jet fuel as apposed to emissions allowances under
recently proposed EU legislation.
Although the existing literature deals extensively with cost and environmental
impacts of renewable jet fuels (Stratton et al. (2010), Hileman et al. (2009, 2010, 2011),
Pearlson (2011), IATA (201Gb)), chapter 3 adds to the literature in several ways. Section
3.2 relates renewable jet fuel greenhouse gas abatement cost to renewable jet fuel cost
premium and life-cycle greenhouse gas (LC-GHG) emissions reduction. While other
studies have looked into the greenhouse gas abatement cost of corn ethanol and biodiesel
(DEFRA, 2008) and the greenhouse gas abatement cost to taxpayers of ethanol and
biodiesel renewable fuel tax credits (CBO, 2010), this thesis relates greenhouse gas
abatement cost of current renewable jet fuels. Further, this section adds to the literature
by using the social cost of carbon to estimate goals for renewable jet fuel cost premium
for different renewable fuel production pathways. This knowledge could be used by
industry, airlines and policy makers to estimate fuel cost premium goals. Section 3.3
provides the first analysis of a hypothetical renewable jet fuel mandate.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The thesis is divided into five chapters. An overview of the remaining chapters follows.
Chapter 2 presents research background, approach, results and conclusions regarding the
impact of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on US aviation (research
question 1). This chapter is a slightly modified version of Malina et al. (2012), with an
additional analysis of the opportunity for US renewable jet fuel production and
consumption on the North Atlantic under the EU-ETS.
Chapter 3 addresses research questions 2, 3 and 4. Renewable jet fuel greenhouse gas
abatement cost estimates are addressed and used in the section on assessing the impacts a
hypothetical renewable jet fuel mandate.
15
Chapter 4 discusses and concludes the content of this thesis and provides
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2
2 The Impact of the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme on US aviation5
2.1 Introduction
In 2005, the European Union (EU) implemented an emissions trading scheme (ETS) for
certain industries and installations to partially fulfill its obligations under the Kyoto
framework to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (European Union, 2003). The EU-ETS is
currently in its second phase (2008-2012) and a third phase will operate from 2013-2020.
The EU will develop post-2020 climate policies according to future international policy
developments and progress in the understanding of the science of global climate change
(European Union, 2009a).
The EU-ETS sets progressively lower caps on annual greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and caps 2020 emissions at 79% of 2005 emissions. The EU-ETS operates in
all 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It covers carbon
dioxide (C0 2 ) emissions and nitrous oxide emissions from installations in the energy
sector such as power stations, combustion plants and oil refineries, and emissions from
most other industrial installations (e.g., iron and steel works; and brick, cement, ceramics,
lime, pulp, paper and board manufacturing).
In 2008, the European Commission adopted directive 2008/101/EC, which states
that aviation will be included in the EU-ETS from the beginning of 2012 (European
Union, 2009b). All flights to or from airports in the 30 ETS countries, irrespective of
carrier nationality, will have to acquire allowances to cover CO 2 emissions. While the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Air Transport
Association (IATA) generally support market-based policies to abate aviation emissions,
5 Please note that this is a slightly modified version of the paper: "The Impact of the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme on US Aviation", Robert Malina, Dominic McConnachie, Niven Winchester, Christoph
Wollersheim, Sergey Paltsev and Ian A. Waitz, Journal of Air Transport Management, Volume 19, March
2012, Pages 36-41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2011.12.004. My contribution to this paper
included: APMT-Economics modeling, assisting with external data collection and analysis and assistance
writing the journal article and editing.
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the inclusion of aviation in the EU-ETS has been challenged outside the EU. Some
foreign governments and airlines argue that EU-ETS in its current form is both unjustly
harmful to airlines and contravenes international treaties, such as the Chicago
Convention. In this connection, the US government has requested an exemption from the
EU-ETS for US carriers. Additionally, some US airlines and their trade body, the
Aviation Transport Association (ATA), have filed a case in the European Court of
Justice. A court ruling is expected by early 2012 (Kanter, 2011, ATA, 2011)6. Other
countries, such as China, are also calling for exemptions (Flottau et al., 2011). Under
current EU legislation, an exemption may be granted for airlines from countries that
implement measures "equivalent" to those in the EU to reduce GHG emissions (European
Union, 2009b).
In extending the EU-ETS to aviation, the European Commission will allocate
aviation allowances for 97% of average annual emissions from 2004-2006 in 2012, and
95% of the same historical average from 2013-2020. However, aviation emissions may
exceed the quantity of aviation emissions allowances if aviation buys allowances from
other sectors covered by the EU-ETS and/or purchases emissions credits from certain
clean energy projects. Under current regulations, 85% of aviation emissions allowances
will be granted for free (grandfathered) each year based on each carrier's market share in
2010, and 15% of allowances will be auctioned. However, EU legislation allows policy
makers to revise the number of allowances grandfathered from 2015 onwards.
In our analysis, we assess the economic impact of including aviation in the EU-
ETS on US airlines. Although several authors have examined the impact of the EU-ETS
on aviation (e.g., Anger, 2010), to our knowledge, no study focuses on US aviation. We
also add to the existing literature by assessing welfare changes in the aviation industry
due to the EU-ETS.
This chapter has five further sections. Our modeling framework is detailed in
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents and discusses our core results. We conduct a welfare
analysis in Section 2.4, and a sensitivity analysis is implemented in Section 2.5. In
6 In March 2012, Airlines for America (formerly Air Transport Association) formally ended this lawsuit
against aviation's inclusion in the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (ATW, 2012).
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Section 2.6 we explore the opportunity for US airlines using renewable jet fuel under the
EU-ETS. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Modeling Framework
Following Winchester et al. (2011), we assess the impact of the EU-ETS on aviation by
linking an economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a partial
equilibrium model that focuses on the aviation industry. We use a CGE model to
determine the impact of the EU-ETS on fuel prices and GDP, and simulate the impact of
changes in these variables in a partial equilibrium model of the aviation industry.
Our chosen CGE model is the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model.
The EPPA model is a recursive dynamic model of the global economy that links GHG
emissions to economic activity and has been widely used to evaluate climate policies
(see, for example, Paltsev et al., 2007 and 2009). The model is described in detail by
Paltsev et al. (2005).
We model the aviation industry using the Aviation Portfolio Management Tool
for Economics (APMT-E). APMT-E is one of a series of models that is being developed
by the FAA and the Partnership for Air Transportation Noise and Emissions Reduction
Center of Excellence. The APMT tool suite is designed to assess the effects of aviation
on the environment, and APMT-E focuses on airline responses to policy changes. The
model has been used in support of US-ICAO/GIACC (2009) and ICAO/CAEP (2010)
and is outlined by MVA Consultancy (2009). In APMT-E, airlines can respond to CO 2
costs by raising prices (and flying less) and, when purchasing new aircraft, selecting
more fuel efficient alternatives. The model is calibrated using 2006 data.
APMT-E identifies 23 route groups (e.g., North Atlantic, Domestic US, North America-
South America and Europe-Africa). As we wish to determine the impact of the policy on
US airlines, our analysis focuses on the North Atlantic. Based on Kincaid and Tretheway
(2007), in APMT-E, the price elasticity of demand on the North Atlantic for passenger
travel is assumed to be -0.72 and -0.99 for freight.
Existing functionality in APMT-E does not allow us to consider at least two
second-order effects of the EU-ETS on US airlines. First, we do not consider the impact
of the policy on US carriers on routes outside the North Atlantic, such as decreased US
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domestic flights due to reduced connecting passengers from North Atlantic flights.
Second, we do not consider asymmetric effects of the EU-ETS on competitiveness. For
example, cost increases for US airlines transporting passengers to non-EU destinations
via the EU relative to airlines that bypass the EU. This argument has been widely voiced
by the EU aviation industry, but Albers et al. (2009) conclude that competitive distortions
due to the EU-ETS will be small.
To evaluate the impact of the EU-ETS on US airlines, we need to identify impacts
on the North Atlantic route by carrier nationality. APMT-E identifies airline nationality
for passenger travel, but not for freight. We extend APMT-E using market share data
from the International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2010) and the US Department
of Transportation (US Department of Transportation, 2011 a) to estimate freight
transported by US carriers on the North Atlantic. We do not consider freight transported
by passenger aircraft (belly freight).
Grandfathered permits will be allocated according to 2010 markets shares in total
EU-ETS traffic, measured in revenue tonne kilometers (RTKs). In our APMT-E
modeling exercises, augmented to identify freight by nationality, the 2010 market share
of US carriers is 9%. We validate this figure using data from the Marketing Information
Data Transfer (MIDT) database. The market share of US airlines in total European traffic
using this database is 10.2%. However, our MIDT market share calculation is biased
upwards, as we are only able to obtain cargo data for US operations on the Atlantic.
Consequently, our calculations include US cargo to and from several non-European
regions, including Africa, the Middle East and India. Additionally, the external
calculations apply to traffic to, within and from all European countries, not just EU-ETS
countries. For these reasons, and to be consistent with APMT-E baseline assumptions,
our allocation of free allowances to US airlines is based on a 9% market share. We
consider a US market of 11% in a sensitivity analysis.
Our analysis focuses on the period 2012-2020. We limit our analysis to this time
frame as the third phase of the EU-ETS will end in 2020 and information on future
provisions is not currently available. We do not consider climate policies in regions other
than the EU, so we do not model potential interdependencies between policies imposed
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by different regions. APMT-E does not identify individual carriers, so our results
represent average industry impacts.
To investigate the impact of the EU-ETS on US aviation, we compare three
scenarios with a reference case ("business as usual", BaU). Our reference scenario is
based on US-ICAO/GIACC (2009). As we aim to examine the incremental impact of
including aviation in the EU-ETS, we modify US-ICAO/GIACC forecasts to account for
the impact of the EU-ETS on other sectors. Specifically, using predictions from an EPPA
simulation of the EU-ETS that excludes aviation, we update US-ICAO/GIACC fuel
prices and demand forecasts. Also, guided by Lee et al., (2001), we assume an annual
increase in the fuel efficiency for new aircraft of 1.4%, rather than 1% in the US-
ICAO/GIACC forecast. We consider a case with a 1% annual increase in fuel efficiency
as a sensitivity study.
In our scenarios, we calculate an effective fuel price, which is equal to the BaU
fuel price plus the cost of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. The price of CO 2
emissions allowances hovered around 615 per tonne of CO 2 (tCO2) for most of 2010
(European Energy Exchange, 2011). There is also evidence that firms are banking
allowances for use in later years (Grubb et al., 2009). Consequently, we assume a carbon
price of 6 15/tCO 2 in 2010 and increase the price by 4% each year. Our 4% annual
increase is approximately equal to the current yield on 10-year German bonds, a low-risk
investment, plus a 1% risk premium. EU legislation prevents airlines from selling
allowances to other sectors, but there are no restrictions on airlines purchasing
allowances from other sectors. Under these regulations, the price of aviation allowances
could differ from that for other sectors. However, empirical evidence (e.g., Winchester et
al., 2011) and our simulations indicate that CO2 abatement costs are higher for aviation
than other sectors, so it is likely that aviation will purchase allowances from elsewhere.
Therefore, we assume that there is a single price of CO 2 allowances for all EU-ETS
covered sectors. Values in APMT-E are expressed in US dollars. We convert euro values
to dollar values using a purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate of 1.24 dollars per
euro (OECD, 2011).
Airlines' cost pass-through behavior is an important determinant of the impact of
the EU-ETS on aviation. Consistent with profit maximizing behavior in competitive
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markets, most studies assume that airlines will pass on the full cost of CO2 allowances,
including opportunity costs associated with 'free' allowances. However, airfares may rise
by less than the cost of CO2 allowances for at least two reasons. First, there may be
opportunity benefits from using free allowances. Opportunity benefits arise when current
traffic is used to determine future allowance allocations. The presence of opportunity
benefits creates an incentive for airlines to reduce fares (and expand demand) relative to a
case without opportunity benefits. If there are opportunity benefits, airfares will increase
by less than the cost of allowances or may decrease.
The allocation of free allowances for aviation in the EU-ETS is currently based on
a one-off benchmark using market share data for 2010, measured in RTKs. This
benchmark will likely be used until 2020. If the EU follows current regulation, future
allocations will be based on market shares in the year ending 24 months before the start
of the next trading period (2020). As operations from 2012-2017 and from 2019-2020
would not influence the share of free allowances allocated post 2020, opportunity
benefits are unlikely to be present in these years. Opportunity benefits may exist in non-
benchmark years, if current market shares depend on past operations, but incentives to
inflate market shares in non-benchmark years are likely to be second order. Overall, we
expect opportunity costs to be passed on to consumers during all years except 2018.
In 2018, opportunity benefits may exist, but would depend on the proportion of
allowances grandfathered for future years. Although there are no historical observations
for aviation, the European Commission has decreased the share of allowances
grandfathered to other sectors over time. For example, nearly all allowances were
grandfathered in the first trading period (2005-2007) and in the third trading period
(2013-2020) around 50% of allowances will be grandfathered (European Commission,
2009b). This indicates that the number of allowances which are granted for free to
airlines may be reduced, once the introductory trading period for aviation ends in 2020. It
therefore appears that opportunity benefits in 2018 will be small.
Market distortions due to imperfect competition are a second reason why airlines
might not fully pass on additional costs. Economic theory suggests that full cost pass-
through will occur in competitive markets, in which prices reflect marginal production
costs and no abnormal profit margins are present. That is, the absence of significant
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profits leaves no room for firms to absorb costs without going bankrupt. If a firm has
market power, however, it can charge a price that exceeds marginal production costs and
earn higher profits than in a competitive market. The existence of profits leaves room for
firms to raise prices by less than the increase in costs without going bankrupt. Under most
theories of imperfect competition, an airline will absorb a proportion of costs increases,
so fares will increase by less than the cost of CO 2 allowances.
While several empirical studies investigate market structure and cost pass-through for
other industries (e.g., Sijm et al., 2006, Ellerman and Joskow, 2008; and Butraw and
Palmer, 2008), few studies focus on the airline industry. One exception is Forsyth (2008),
which concludes that full cost pass-through is a likely outcome, if airlines do not have
substantial market power.
The number of suppliers is sometimes used to infer market power. Airline
schedule data for June 2011 shows that 91% of all routes (defined as airport pairs) on the
North Atlantic are served by one or two carriers. At face value, this suggests that airlines
have market power on most North Atlantic routes. However, a small number of carriers
on a particular route may not be a good indicator of market power as (a) some airport-
pairs serve overlapping catchment areas (e.g., EWR-LHR and JFK-LHR), (b) direct
routes may compete with routes involving a connecting flight (e.g., FRA-SFO and FRA-
BOS-SFO), (c) connecting passengers for whom the non-stop flight is only part of their
journey might select other itineraries (e.g., SFO-AMS-BUD instead of SFO-FRA-BUD)
and (d) the threat of entrants (except in congested airports such as FRA, JFK, LHR and
ORD) may prevent airlines from offering fares significantly greater than costs.
To assess actual market power on the North Atlantic, it is informative to examine
profit margins. According to data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (US
Department of Transportation, 2011 b), the annual average profit margin for Atlantic
divisions of US airlines was 3.4% of operating revenue between 2000 and 2010, and
3.8% between 2006 and 2010. These profit margins are lower than the average profit
margin for publicly listed US companies, which was 5.3% between 2000 and 2010 and
4.8% between 2006 and 2010 (Damadoran, 2011). Therefore, we conclude that the North
Atlantic market for air services is, on average, competitive. This conclusion is consistent
with the antitrust immunity analyses conducted by the US Department of Transportation.
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In its tentative decision to grant antitrust immunity for a joint venture between oneworld
airlines on some North Atlantic operations, the US Department of Transportation stated
that, "no single airline [on the North Atlantic] has a dominant share of nonstop
passengers, indicating a general competitive market" (US Department of Transportation,
2010).
Overall, because we conclude that opportunity benefits are likely to be small and
that the North Atlantic route is competitive, we believe airlines are likely to pass on all
costs associated with CO 2 allowances. When firms pass on all costs (including
opportunity costs) and allowances are grandfathered, firms receive windfall gains
(William-Derry and de Place, 2008). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that imperfect
competition among airlines and the presence of opportunity benefits may result in airfares
rising by less than the cost of CO2 allowances. To account for uncertainty about airline
behavior and opportunity benefits, we consider three scenarios.
In our first scenario, FULL, we assume that airlines pass on all costs associated
with CO2 allowances, including opportunity costs for free allowances. Airlines pass on
expenses from purchasing allowances but not opportunity costs for free allowances in our
second scenario, which we label EXPENSE. In our third scenario, ABSORB, airlines do
not pass on any costs associated with CO2 allowances. The three scenarios cover a broad
spectrum of airline responses to the EU-ETS. As noted above, we believe the FULL
scenario is the most accurate representation of future airline behavior.
To foreshadow our results, the largest rise in airfares and decreases in traffic and
CO2 emissions will occur in the FULL scenario. We also expect profits to increase in the
full scenario, as airlines receive a large proportion of allowances for free and pass on
opportunity costs of these allowances to consumers. Airfares will increase and traffic and
CO2 emissions will decrease in the EXPENSE scenario, but by smaller amounts than in
the FULL scenario. In the ABSORB scenario, there will be no change in airfares, traffic,
or CO2 emissions, and profits will decrease.
2.3 Results
As noted in Section 2, we start from an emissions price of El 5/tCO2 in 2010 and increase
the price by 4% each year. Using a PPP exchange rate, the CO2 price, in 2010 dollars, is
24
$20/tCO2 in 2012 and rises to $27.45/tCO2 by 2020. The price of a gallon of jet fuel in
BaU is $2.29 in 2012 and $2.77 in 2020. Our BaU fuel prices are an extrapolation of
2006 (the base year for APMT-E) fuel prices based on long-run forecasts and accounting
for the impact of the EU-ETS applied to other sectors. As such, our BaU prices do not
necessarily reflect current fuel prices, which can be influenced by business cycles and
speculation. When aviation is included in the EU-ETS, the effective price of jet fuel
(including CO 2 allowance costs) when flying to or from the EU in 2020 is $2.82 per
gallon, 10% higher than in BaU.
Table 1 presents cumulative modeling results for US carriers on the North
Atlantic for the period 2012-2020. We evaluate cumulative traffic changes by calculating
the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for RTKs. In the FULL scenario, demand
decreases relative to BaU but RTKs continue to grow. Between 2011 and 2020, RTKs
increase by 31.8% in the FULL scenario, compared to 34.5% in BaU. Airfare increases
are smaller when airlines only pass on the costs of purchased allowances rather than all
costs, so the annual growth rate for RTKs in the EXPENSE scenario exceeds that in the
FULL scenario. There are no changes in RTKs in the ABSORB scenario relative to BaU,
as airfares are the same in the two scenarios.
Table 1. Cumulative US carrier outcomes on the North Atlantic, 2012-2020.
EXPENS
BaU FULL ABSORB
E
RTKs (CAGR, %) 3.35 3.11 3.25 3.35
CO 2 emissions (CAGR, %) 1.72 1.49 1.63 1.72
CO 2 Emissions (tonnes, million) 210.10 206.74 208.93 210.10
Allowances purchased (million) - 71.13 73.31 74.48
Out-of-Sector CO 2 Reductions (million) - 71.13 73.31 74.48
Share of allowances purchased (%) - 34.40 35.09 35.45
NPV of purchased allowances ($, billion) - 1.37 1.41 1.43
Operating costs, NPV ($, billion) 143.02 141.76 143.50 144.45
Operating revenue, NPV ($, billion) 147.37 148.62 147.81 147.37
Operating revenue per RTK, NPV ($/RTK) 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.87
Profit margin (%) 2.95 4.62 2.92 1.98
Net US to EU transfer, NPV ($, billion) - -1.24 1.41 1.43
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Increases in traffic drive increases in CO 2 emissions, but emissions increases are smaller
than traffic increases as the fleet becomes more efficient over time. The lowest annual
growth in emissions occurs when airlines pass on all costs associated with CO2
allowances. Table 1 also reports cumulative CO 2 emissions between 2012 and 2020.
Comparing emissions for or policy scenarios to the BaU indicates that 3.35 million
tonnes of CO2 are abated in the FULL scenario and 1.17 million tonnes in the EXPENSE
scenario. These numbers represent small proportional decreases in emissions relative to
BaU - 1.6% in the FULL scenario and 0.6% in the EXPENSE scenario. Annual CO 2
emissions from US airlines on the North Atlantic increase from 21.9 million tonnes in
2011 to 25.2 million tonnes in 2020 in the BaU, and to 24.7 million tonnes in the FULL
scenario. In the FULL scenario, US airlines purchase approximately 71.13 million
emissions allowances. This is estimated to lead to out of sector abatement of 71.13
million tonnes CO2 in the EU between 2012 and 2020, or about one third of total US
airline emissions for the North Atlantic routes. All airlines purchase about 840 million
emissions allowances which leads to the abatement of about 840 million tonnes CO2
between 2012 and 2020, or approximately 2% of all EU emissions (UNFCC, 2008).
Although emissions abated by aviation differ across scenarios, abatement
aggregated across all sectors is constant due to the economy-wide emissions cap. That is,
the increase in aviation emissions is facilitated by purchasing allowances from sectors
with lower abatement costs. In this connection, our EPPA simulations indicate that EU
electricity emissions will be 57% below 2012 emissions in 2020. Between 2012 and
2020, in the FULL scenario, US airlines purchase allowances for about one-third of total
allowances required by US airlines. Allowance purchases are largest in the ABSORB
scenario, as traffic is largest in this scenario.
Net present values (NPVs) for financial indicators for US operations on the North
Atlantic during the period 2012-2020 are presented in the second half of Table 1. Our
NPV calculations use a discount rate of 4%, which is similar to the discount rate
recommended by the US Office of Management and Budget (2003). As airfares in the
ABSORB scenario equal BAU airfares, total operating costs rise by the cost of
allowances in this scenario. In the EXPENSE scenario, the increase in airfares reduces
traffic and operating costs net of CO 2 costs. However, the cost of purchasing CO2
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allowances results in a rise in total costs relative to BaU. Total costs decrease in the
FULL scenario, as decreases in cost due to reduced traffic exceed the cost of purchasing
allowances.
Operating revenues are a function of traffic and air fares. As demand is inelastic,
the revenue impact of reduced RTKs is more than offset by an increase in airfares in the
FULL scenario, so operating revenues increase. Operating revenue also increases in the
EXPENSE scenario. Airfares and traffic in the ABSORB scenario are unchanged relative
to BaU, so there is no change in operating revenues. Decreased RTKs and increased
revenue result in revenue per RTK increasing in both the FULL and EXPENSE
scenarios.
The impact of the policy on profit margins is of key interest to airlines. We
calculate average profit margins for the period 2012-2020 by dividing the NPV of
operating revenues by the NPV of operating costs. Airlines pass on the cost of purchasing
allowances in the EXPENSE scenario, so the profit margin in this scenario is very similar
to the profit margin in BaU. However, total profits decrease relative to BaU because the
profit margin is earned on a lower volume. In the ABSORB scenario, as airlines incur
additional costs that are not passed on, the average profit margin decreases. In the FULL
scenario, there is a large increase in the profit margin because, in addition to the cost of
purchasing allowances, airlines pass on opportunity costs associated with grandfathered
allowances. Windfall gains from grandfathering are worth $2.6 billion in the FULL
scenario.
Windfall gains from free allowances represent a transfer from the EU to the US.
However, allowances purchased by US airlines from the European Commission and from
EU firms represent a transfer from the US to the EU. In the FULL scenario, the NPV of
free allowances exceeds the value of purchases resulting in a net transfer from the EU to
the US. In the EXPENSE and ABSORB scenarios, there are no windfall gains, which
result in net transfers from the US to the EU. Consistent with the scope of our economic
analysis we do not address the distribution of environmental damages associated with the
US aviation operations on the North Atlantic, although we anticipate impacts in both the
EU and US (in addition to other impacts globally).
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To summarize our analysis so far, for all cost pass-through assumptions, traffic
and CO2 emissions continue to increase over time when aviation is included in the EU-
ETS. When some CO2 costs are passed on to consumers, there are small decreases in
emissions relative to BaU. Unlike CO 2 emissions, the impact of the EU-ETS on airline
profitability varies widely for alternative cost pass-through assumptions. If there is full
cost pass-through, which we believe is the most likely case, US airlines will experience a
windfall gain of $2.6 billion over the period 2012-2020 from the granting of free
allowances. On the other hand, if airlines are only able to pass on the costs of allowances
purchased or are unable to pass on any costs, US airline profits will decrease.
Our analysis has focused on the operations of US airlines on the North Atlantic,
which accounts for about 12% of total operations for US airlines measured in RTKs. To
gauge the overall impact of the EU-ETS on US aviation, we report selected metrics for
total US operations in Table 2. The results indicate that the EU-ETS will have a very
small impact on aggregate RTKs and CO2 emissions. In the FULL scenario, which
generates the largest decrease in emissions, total US airline CO 2 emissions fall by only
0.19% relative to BaU. Similarly, for all scenarios, there are small changes in operating
revenues, operating costs and profit margins relative to BaU. These results indicate that
the EU-ETS will have a relatively small impact on the overall operations of US airlines.
Table 2. Cumulative US carrier outcomes on all routes, 2012-2020.
BaU FULL EXPENSE ABSORB
RTKs CAGR (%) 3.65 3.62 3.63 3.65
CO 2 Emissions (tonne, million) 2,139 2,136 2,138 2,139
Operating costs, NPV ($, billion) 1,589 1,588 1,590 1,591
Operating revenue, NPV ($, billion) 1,637 1,639 1,638 1,637
Profit margin (%) 2.92 3.07 2.92 2.83
2.4 Welfare Analysis
Policies such as the EU-ETS aim to reduce future damages from global warming.
Benefits from avoided climate damages will not be limited to aviation, but will occur
across the global economy. Additionally, the impact of the EU-ETS will depend on
policies in other nations. Ellerman and Buchner (2007 and 2008) discuss the
effectiveness of the EU-ETS in mitigating climate change, but a similar analysis is
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beyond the scope of our study. Instead, we evaluate the cost of including aviation in the
EU-ETS within the aviation sector and investigate the distribution of costs across airlines
and consumers. Our welfare calculations only concern aviation operations on the North
Atlantic.
We use producer surplus, measured by operating profits, to calculate costs to
airlines and consumer surplus to evaluate costs to consumers. Aviation consumers
include travelers, consignors and freight recipients. We assume a linear demand curve to
calculate changes in consumer surplus. For each year and scenario, the change in
consumer surplus, ACS, is given by:
ACS = }(go + qi)x(po - p1) 2.1
where qo and q, are North Atlantic air traffic (measured in RTKs) in, respectively, BaU
and the policy scenario; and po and p, are airfares in BaU and the policy scenario
respectively.
We summarize annual changes in producer surplus and consumer surplus by
calculating NPVs for each measure aggregated over the period 2012-2020, again using a
discount rate of 4%. Although it would be informative to calculate welfare changes
specifically for US producers and consumers, our modeling framework does do not track
consumers by country of origin. Additionally, although there are estimates of future US
passengers on the North Atlantic, there is little guidance on how to measure consumer
benefits from freight. Instead, we calculate consumer surplus changes for all consumers
on the North Atlantic. To facilitate comparison of producer surplus changes with
consumer surplus changes, we also calculate producer surplus for all North Atlantic
carriers.
Table 3. Cumulative consumer and producer surplus changes relative to BaU ($, billion), 2012-2020.
FULL EXPENSE ABSORB
Consumer surplus, all consumers, NPV -11.39 -4.04 0.00
Producer surplus, all airlines, NPV 6.39 -0.08 -4.89
Producer and consumer surplus, NPV -5.00 -4.12 -4.89
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Table 3 presents NPV consumer and producer surplus changes relative to BaU for the
2012-2020 period. In the FULL scenario, consumer surplus decreases, due to higher fares
and less traffic. Producer surplus increases in this scenario, as windfall gains more than
offset the impact of reduced traffic. There is a smaller decrease in consumer surplus in
the EXPENSE scenario, as airfare increases are smaller in this scenario than in the FULL
scenario. There is little change in Producer Surplus in the EXPENSE scenario, as airlines
pass on the costs of purchasing permits and there are no windfall gains. In the ABSORB
scenario, there is no change in consumer outcomes and producer surplus decreases.
The sum of changes in consumer and producer surplus is negative in all scenarios.
This result is not surprising, as the EU-ETS imposes additional costs on airlines and we
do not consider benefits from emissions abatement or revenue from purchased
allowances. However, as noted above, the inclusion of aviation in the EU-ETS is
expected to reduce EU emissions by about 840 million tonnes CO 2. The change in social
surplus differs across scenarios, but the numbers do not indicate that a particular cost
pass-through behavior is preferable, as we do not consider interactions with other sectors.
For example, greater demand for allowances in the ABSORB scenario relative to other
scenarios, will increase the price of allowances and decrease consumer surplus in other
sectors.
2.5 Sensitivity analysis
A key finding in our analysis is that the EU-ETS will have a relatively small impact on
aviation emissions. This result is driven by high marginal abatement costs in aviation
relative to other sectors and is consistent with findings from other studies (e.g.,
Winchester et al., 2011). Consequently, we do not investigate the sensitivity of this result
to our modeling assumptions. Our finding that the EU-ETS may increase profits for US
airlines is potentially more controversial. Influential drivers of this result, which we
consider in sensitivity analyses, include future demand for air services on the North
Atlantic, and the number of allowances grandfathered. We also examine the sensitivity of
our results to the annual increase in the fuel efficiency of new aircraft, and the market
share of US airlines in total European operations. The EU-ETS has little impact on profits
in the EXPENSE scenario, so our analysis focuses on the FULL and ABSORB scenarios.
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Our BaU demand forecasts are derived from US-ICAO/GIACC estimates. Faster or
slower underlying demand growth will influence the quantity of allowances required by
aviation and ultimately airline profitability. Demand for air services on the North Atlantic
grew by 3.4% per year in the core scenarios. In separate sensitivity analyses, we consider
demand growth rates of 2.4% and 5.5% in both BaU and our policy scenarios.
Figure 1 displays proportional changes in average 2012-2020 profit margins
relative to BaU for the core demand growth scenario and for low and high demand
growth alternatives. In high-growth scenarios, airlines need to purchase more allowances
than in our base case and fewer in low-growth scenarios. In the FULL scenario with high
growth, the relative contribution of (fixed) windfall gains decreases, so the increase in
profit margin is lower than in the core FULL scenario. The opposite is true in the FULL
scenario with low growth. In the ABSORB scenario, airlines also have to purchase more
allowances if there is higher demand growth. Consequently, the average profit margin in
the high growth scenario decreases by a larger amount than in the corresponding core
scenario.
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Figure 1. Changes in 20 12-2020 average profit margins relative to BaU for alternative demand forecasts,
Regarding allowance allocations, we followed current legislation in our core scenarios
and assumed that allowances for 85% of 2010 emissions will be grandfathered each year
from 2012 to 2020. However, EU regulations provide scope for changes to allocation
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rules from 2015 onwards and the European Commission has reduced the number of
allowances grandfathered to other sectors following introductory periods. Consequently,
we consider cases where, beginning in 2015, (a) 50% of aviation benchmark allowances
are grandfathered, and (b) aviation receives no free allowances.
Changes in average profit margins for alternative allowance allocation assumptions and
our base case, which assumes that 85% of allowances are grandfathered each year after
2015, are displayed in Figure 2. Airlines have to purchase more allowances when fewer
allowances are grandfathered, which reduces profit margins in all scenarios. The largest
decrease in profits is in the ABSORB scenario, but the average profit margin is still
positive. However, 2012-2020 average profit margins mask important annual variations.
In the ABSORB scenario, profit margins decrease to 1.03% by 2020 when 50% of
allowances are grandfathered, and are negative (-0.06%) in 2020 when all allowances are
auctioned. Profits are always positive in the FULL scenario as grandfathering fewer
allowances only erodes windfall gains.
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Figure 2. Changes in 20 12-2020 average profit margins relative to BaU for alternative allowance
allocations, %.
Decreasing the proportion of allowances grandfathered also has a large impact on
net transfers from the US to the EU. When all post-2015 allowances are auctioned, net
US to EU transfers between 2012 and 2020 are $2.21 billion in the FULL scenario
(compared to -1.24 billion when 85% of allowances are grandfathered). The
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corresponding value in the ABSORB scenario is $3.15 billion (compared to 1.43 billon
when 85% of allowances are auctioned).
In another analysis, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the annual
improvement in fuel efficiency for new aircraft. In our core scenarios, guided by Lee et
al. (2001), we assumed a 1.4% annual improvement in fuel efficiency. We now consider
a 1% annual increase in fuel efficiency, as used by US-ICAO/GIACC (2009). When fuel
efficiency is lower, airlines have to acquire more CO 2 allowances per flight. Traffic is
largest in the ABSORB scenario, so lowering fuel efficiency has the largest impact in this
scenario. However, the value of permits purchased between 2012 and 2020 in the
ABSORB scenario with lower fuel efficiency is only 2.3% higher than in our core
ABSORB scenario. Consequently, a lower increase in fuel efficiency also has a minor
impact on profit margins. For example, in the ABSORB scenario, the profit margin for
US airlines is 1.97% when the annual increase in fuel efficiency is 1%, compared to
1.98% in our core analysis.
As mentioned above, the share of allowances grandfathered will be based on 2010
market shares in total traffic to, from and within EU-ETS countries. Official market share
data had not been released by the European Commission at the time of writing. The 2010
market share of US airlines in total EU-ETS operations derived from APMT-E was 9%,
and an estimate from an external data source was 10.2%. To investigate the impact of a
higher market share for US airlines on our results, we consider a market share of 11% in
a sensitivity analysis.
Increasing the market share of US carriers increases emissions from US airlines in
the BaU and the policy scenarios, but has no impact on profit margins in our policy
scenarios relative to BaU. This is because the number of free allowances increases with
market share-driven increases in emissions. On the other hand, increasing total market
share of US airlines has a large impact on international transfers. In the FULL scenario,
the 2012-2020 NPV of transfers from the EU to the US is $1.5 billion when the US
market share is 11%, 20% higher than when the market share is 9%. The increase in the
EU-to-US transfer is driven by larger windfall gains to US airlines. In the ABSORB
scenario, US airlines have to purchase more allowances when they have a higher market
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share, so transfers from the US to the EU are $1.69 billion, 18% larger than in our core
scenario.
2.6 Renewable Jet Fuel Use in the EU-ETS
Under the EU-ETS there is an interesting opportunity for airlines to use renewable jet
fuel instead of purchasing EU emissions allowances. In February 2012, the EU released a
draft regulation on verification and monitoring of GHGs. Included in the plan are
instructions for airlines to report the amount of biomass they use so that biofuels can be
accounted as zero emission (European Union, 2012). This regulation is still in draft form
and so not European law. However, it raises an interesting question of if and when
renewable jet fuel will be cheaper for airlines than EU emissions allowances. In this
section I analyze the opportunity for airlines to use renewable jet fuel if this regulation
were to become law. In particular, I quantify if, and when, it would be cheaper for
airlines to purchase renewable jet fuel as apposed to EU emissions allowances.
It is possible to analytically link the EU emissions allowance price to a price
premium of renewable jet fuel relative to conventional jet fuel. The logic being that the
carbon price effectively increases the cost of jet fuel per gallon. Renewable jet fuel would
also increase the effective cost of jet fuel per gallon. According to Article 38 of the draft
regulation, all biomass based renewable jet fuel will be assigned a zero GHG emissions
factor. It would be cheaper for airlines to use renewable jet fuel when the effective
increase in jet fuel prices is less than the increase from the carbon dioxide price. The
relationship described above can be defined analytically. First, the carbon dioxide price
would increase jet fuel per gallon by
Ajetcarbon dioxide = Pco2 * K (2.2)
where Pco2 is the price of carbon dioxide in the EU-ETS, K is equal to the LC-GHG
emissions from one gallon of conventional jet fuel and AJetCarbon dioxide is the net
increase in jet fuel prices. Next, the increase in the jet fuel price from renewable jet fuel
is calculated as equal to the price difference between renewable jet fuel and conventional
jet fuel, as shown in equation 2.3.
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AietRenewable Fuel = (RF - PCF)
where PRF is the price of renewable jet fuel, PCF is equal to the price of conventional jet
fuel and AJetRenewable Fuel is equal to the net increase in jet fuel prices. Therefore it is
cheaper for airlines to purchase renewable jet fuel when:
AietCarbon dioxide >AjetRenewable Fuel
:. PC0 2 * K > (PRF - PCF)
(2.4)
(2.5)
Equation 2.5 reads that when the price premium of renewable fuel above the
petroleum based jet fuel price, (which is comparable to the renewable identification
number (RIN) price discussed in appendix I), is less than the emissions allowance price
in the EU-ETS multiplied by constant K, it is cheaper for airlines to purchase renewable
jet fuel, given appropriate EU policy. Equation 2.5 is plotted in figure 3.
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Figure 3. The relationship between allowance price and renewable fuel price premium.
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(2-3)
Two conclusions can be drawn from figure 3 and equation 2.5. Firstly, figure 3 shows
that with the current allowance price at around $8/tCO 2 (WSJ, 2012), it is cheaper for
airlines to use renewable jet fuel only if it has a price premium of about 10 cents or less.
In chapter 3 I review literature and industry estimates of renewable jet fuel. The only
commercially available renewable jet fuel in the US at the moment has a price premium
of about $2.70 (Dynamic Fuels 2012). Theoretical estimates fall in a similar and higher
range. Therefore it is currently cheaper for airlines to purchase emissions allowances in
the EU-ETS than purchase renewable jet fuel. This may change over time as renewable
jet fuel decreases in price and EU emissions allowances increase in price.
Secondly, the current white paper EU legislation assigns all biomass based renewable
jet fuels a zero emissions factor. Most renewable jet fuels have an emissions factor above
0% (Stratton et al, 2010). This means that renewable jet fuel can have a 40% emissions
reduction compared to conventional jet fuel, and be given credit for 100% reduction,
resulting in a benefit for the renewable jet fuel industry, and airlines of a 60% factor.
Even with this benefit, no renewable jet fuels examined in this thesis are cheaper than
emissions allowances. Further, some renewable jet fuels have an emissions factor less
than zero. For example switchgrass to F-T with carbon capture and sequestration
(Stratton et al., 2010). For these fuels, the price airlines would be willing to pay for
renewable jet fuel for a given allowance price would increase slightly.
Given the current EU proposal, equation 2.5 and figure 3 can be used by airlines to
determine if it is cheaper to purchase renewable jet fuel or emissions allowances. If the
EU changes the legislation and requires emissions factors of renewable jet fuel to be
considered, then the renewable jet fuel abatement costs shown table 7 and 8 in this thesis
can be directly compared to the EU allowance price. In both cases in is currently cheaper
to purchase emissions allowances than the renewable jet fuels shown in table 7 and 8.
It is important to note that the EU white paper legislation in most cases overestimates
the societal benefits of renewable jet fuel by giving all fuels a zero emissions factor.
2.7 Conclusions
We evaluated the impact of the EU-ETS on US airlines during the period 2012-2020.
Reflecting current market behavior, we considered an emissions price of E15/tCO2 in
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2010 that increased by 4% per year. Under the current market structure on the North
Atlantic, we believe airlines will pass on all costs associated with free allowances. On
this assumption, airlines received windfall gains valued at $2.6 billion from the
grandfathering of allowances, and the cost of the policy was borne by consumers. In our
modeling framework, CO 2 emissions from US airlines between 2011 and 2020 increased
by 35% in BaU and 32% under the EU-ETS when there is full cost pass-through. The
small reduction in aviation emissions reflects high abatement costs in aviation relative to
abatement costs in other industries. Results from sensitivity analyses showed that our
findings are robust to plausible alternative parameters for key assumptions.
Under proposed EU legislation regarding waiving emissions allowances when
renewable jet fuels are used, it is currently cheaper for airlines to purchase EU emissions
allowances than renewable jet fuel, even though the EU proposes to assign all biomass
based fuels a zero emissions factor.
Finally, this study cannot be used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of
including aviation in the EU-ETS. In addition to considering benefits from avoided
climate damages, evaluating overall effectiveness would require evaluating economic
costs and benefits in all sectors in the economy. This study only considered costs and
benefits in the aviation industry.
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Chapter 3
3 Estimating Renewable Jet Fuel Abatement Cost Goals and
Assessing the Impact of a Hypothetical Renewable Jet Fuel
Mandate on US Aviation
3.1 Introduction
The International Air Transport Association (IATA), The International Civil Aviation
Association (ICAO) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have set renewable
jet fuel consumption goals for the air transportation industry (IATA 2009, ICAO 2010b
FAA 2011). Renewable jet fuel is seen as a way for the airline industry to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and reduce fuel price volatility through the
development of stable domestic infrastructure (IATA, 2010). In the US, the push for
renewable jet fuel arises in the context of major domestic renewable fuels policy, most
significantly, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007's Renewable Fuels
Standard II (RFS2) that mandates 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel per year by 2022
(EISA, 2007). Please refer to Appendix I for a comprehensive description of the
mechanics of the RFS2. Under RFS2, only gasoline and diesel fuel have mandated blend
ratios. Although producers and blenders can receive credit 7 for making renewable jet fuel,
there are no mandated blend ratios for obligated parties (refineries and importers of
petroleum based fuel) (EPA, 2010). Given the current higher cost of producing renewable
diesels, of which jet fuel is a subset, (Pearlson, 2011), without mandated production
quantities or other incentives, economic theory suggests it is unlikely airlines will
willingly purchase more expensive renewable jet fuel. In this chapter I explore the impact
of such a hypothetical mandate on the US airline industry. The impact and greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions savings of a renewable jet fuel mandate would be significantly
dependent on the production cost and lifecycle greenhouse gas (LC-GHG) emissions of
renewable jet fuel.
7 In the form of the value of a Renewable Identification Number, discussed below.
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In section 3.2 I review literature and industry estimates of cost and LC-GHG.
Moreover, I develop an analytic relationship between renewable jet fuel cost premium
and LC-GHG emissions reduction. I use this equation to relate estimates of the social cost
of carbon (SCC) to cost premium goals of renewable jet fuel. I use the literature and
industry estimates of renewable jet fuel cost premiums to compare the above goals to the
current status of the industry. Finally I compare the abatement cost of several renewable
jet fuel production pathways to each other and the SCC.
In section 3.3 I use the range of literature and industry estimates from section 3.2 to
develop a heuristic model of a renewable jet fuel mandate. In section 3.3.1 I investigate
what a reference, or business-as-usual scenario might look like in terms of renewable jet
fuel production. In section 3.3.2 I investigate the impacts of a renewable jet fuel mandate.
The existing literature deals extensively with cost and environmental impacts of
renewable jet fuels such as Stratton et al. (2010), Hileman et al. (2009, 2010, 2011),
Pearlson (2011) and IATA (2009, 2010). Section 3.2 adds to the literature by relating
renewable jet fuel GHG abatement cost to renewable jet fuel cost premiums and LC-
GHG emissions reduction. While other studies have looked into the GHG abatement cost
of corn ethanol and biodiesel (DEFRA, 2008) and the GHG abatement cost to taxpayers
of ethanol and biodiesel renewable fuel tax credits (CBO, 2010), this section relates GHG
abatement cost of current renewable jet fuels. Further, this section adds to the literature
by using the SCC to estimate goals for renewable jet fuel cost premiums for different
renewable fuel production pathways. This knowledge could be used by industry, airlines
and policy makers to estimate fuel cost premium goals. Section 3.3 presents the first
analysis of a renewable jet fuel mandate. This section also adds to the literature on
comparing fatty acid methyl ester (FAME) and hydro-processed esters and fatty acids
(HEFA). In particular a biodiesel blend wall is calculated. A blend wall is a production
limit on renewable fuel, which occurs because when a fuel cannot be used in its pure
form (100% blend ratio) in an engine. Below I provide a brief background on jet fuel and
renewable jet fuel technology. For a more complete discussion see Hileman et al. (2009),
UOP (2005), or Maurice et al. (2001).
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3.1.1 Jet Fuel Technology
The dominant fuel used by commercial aviation is a petroleum-based liquid fuel called
Jet-A (EIA, 2011). Petroleum, or crude oil, consists primarily of carbon and hydrogen,
and contains traces of nitrogen, oxygen, sulfur and metals (Maurice et al., 2001). Crude
oil is usually processed into a variety of products including gasoline, jet fuel and diesel.
The primary difference between these products is their carbon chain length, as shown in
figure 4. It is important to note that jet fuel falls within part of the range of diesel fuel,
and so can be used interchangeably as jet fuel and diesel. This has implications for use
under the RFS2, which I will discuss below.
Carbon number
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Motor gasoline Carbon number
Boiling point
Jet fuel
Diesel fuel
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Boiling point (*C
Figure 4. Typical distillation ranges and carbon-number ranges for fuels (Hileman et. al., 2009).
In 2010 the US consumed approximately 20 million barrels of oil products per
day, of which about 9% or 1.9 million barrels was used by the airline industry. While
currently nearly all-commercial aircraft use petroleum based jet fuel, there is growing
interest in renewable jet fuels as a way to reduce aviation GHG emissions and decrease
fuel price volatility (IATA 2009, ICAO 201 Ob FAA 2011). The environmental benefits of
renewable fuel are derived primarily from reductions in lifecycle-greenhouse gas (LC-
GHG) emissions as well as reductions in particulate matter (PM), hydrocarbons (HC) and
carbon monoxide (CO). Reduction in LC-GHG emissions is derived because renewable
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fuels use biomass as their source of chemical origin with plants absorbing carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere through photosynthesis.
In terms of renewable jet fuel use, an important distinction is whether the fuel can
be used with current infrastructure, or whether it requires changes to engine technology
and distribution systems. Fuel that can be used with current infrastructure is termed drop-
in renewable fuel (Hileman et al., 2009). These fuels have the same or very similar
chemical properties to petroleum based jet fuels. Examples of renewable fuels that
require large changes to existing infrastructure include biodiesel, liquid hydrogen and
liquid natural gas, as used by the Russian Tu-155 (Tupolev, 2007). In this thesis I focus
on drop-in aviation fuels. However, I consider the important interactions between certain
drop-in fuels such as HEFA and non-drop-in fuels such as biodiesel.
Below, I briefly outline the technology behind two near term renewable jet fuels,
HEFA and BTL via F-T. Other potential renewable jet fuels include sugar-to-jet fuels and
fuel from pyrolysis oils. Please see Hileman et al. (2009, 2011), UOP (2005) or Maurice
et al. (2001), for a more comprehensive list of near term fuels.
3.1.1.1 Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) Synthetic Fuels from Biomass and Coal
Diesel, drop-in jet fuel and naphtha can be produced by vaporizing coal and converting
the gas into synthetic liquid fuels through the Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) process. To make
renewable fuel with reduced GHG emissions, it is possible to add biomass to the coal
before vaporizing in a process dubbed by Hileman et al. (2009) as biomass-to-liquid
(BTL). A 50% blend of F-T synthetic fuel is currently used by O.R. Tambo International
Airport in Johannesburg for commercial aviation use (Sasol, 2011).
3.1.1.2 Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids (HEFA)
Renewable oil (vegetable oils, animal fat, waste grease and algae oil) can be processed
using hydrogen treatment (hydroprocessing) to yield a fuel in distillation range of jet fuel,
diesel and naphtha (Pearlson, 2011, UOP, 2005). HEFA diesel and jet fuel is similar to F-
T synthetic fuel in that it is a drop-in fuel. HEFA meets the requirements of ASTM D975,
or diesel fuel. On July 1 2011, ASTM approved the jet fuel product slate of HEFA under
alternative fuel specification D7566, (ASTM, 2011). HEFA fuel that meets the D7566
specification can be mixed with Jet-A, up to a blend ratio of 50%. Since the certification
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of HEFA in 2011, eleven airlines performed commercial passenger flights with blends of
up to 50% biojet from used cooking oil, jatropha, camelina and algae. Airlines involved
include Finnair, Interjet, Aeromexico, Iberia, Air France, United and Air China as well as
KLM, Lufthansa, Thomson Airways and Alaska Airlines who have done longer series of
regular renewable jet fuel flights (IATA, 2012). Having briefly introduced near term
renewable jet fuel options, I will now discuss their production cost, LC-GHG emissions
reduction and GHG abatement cost in detail.
3.2 Renewable Jet Fuel Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Goals
In this section I develop an analytic relationship between renewable jet fuel cost premium
and LC-GHG emissions reduction. I use this equation to relate estimates of the social cost
of carbon (SCC) to cost premium goals of renewable jet fuel. I also review literature and
industry estimates of renewable jet fuel cost premiums to compare the above goals to the
current status of the industry. Finally I directly compare the abatement cost of several
renewable jet fuel production pathways to each other and the SCC.
3.2.1 An equation for renewable jet fuel greenhouse gas abatement cost
Following Methodology from CBO (2010) and DEFRA (2008), I derive an equation for
the GHG abatement cost of renewable jet fuel. In general terms, the GHG abatement cost
is the cost to abate one tonne of GHG. GHG abatement cost can be expressed as the cost
premium of renewable jet fuel above conventional jet fuel, divided by the GHG
abatement of the renewable jet fuel compared to conventional fuel. This relationship is
shown in equation 3.1 where x designates a given renewable fuel type8 .
Cost Premiumx [$/gallon]G H Gabatement cost,x = GHGabatementx [tonne/gallon] (3'1)
The cost premium of a type of renewable fuel per gallon, shown in equation 3.2,
is the difference between the price of conventional jet fuel and the price of the renewable
jet fuel
8 A renewable jet fuel type designates the combination of feedstock type, production process and land use
change scenario (Stratton et al., 2010 and EPA, 2012c).
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Cost Premum, = ACost, = Pren,x - Pjet (3.2)
where Prenx is the price of renewable jet fuel of a given type (feedstock and production
process combination) and Piet is the price of conventional jet fuel. For a given fuel type,
the denominator of equation 3.1 is equal the LC-GHG emissions per gallon of
conventional jet fuel per gallon, minus the LC-GHG emissions per gallon of renewable
jet fuel as shown in equation 3.3.
GHGabatement,x = tCO2 elgallonconventional jet fuel - tC 0 2 elgallonrenewable jet fuel,x (3.3)
LC-GHG emissions per gallon of fuel are taken from Stratton et al. (2010) who
report emissions in grams of carbon dioxide-equivalent per mega joule, gC02e/MJ, for
26 fuel production pathways/feedstock combinations. C02equivalent or CO2e is equal
to GHG emissions from physical extraction (well) to the aircraft (tank) plus GHG
emissions during engine combustion, as shown in equation 3.4.
CO2e =(C0 2 +GWPCH4 - CH4 +GWPN2O N 2 0)well-to-tan +(CO2ak-to-wake (3.4)
Grams of carbon dioxide per mega joule,gC02e/MJ can be converted to metric
tonnes of carbon dioxide per gallon, tCO2e/gallon, for different fuel types by using a
conversion factor of mega joules per liter, MJ/i, for different fuels found in Hileman et al
(2010). I use a constant conversion factor of -3.79 to convert liters to gallons and divide
by 106 to convert grams to tonnes, as shown in equation 3.5.
[gco~e [ Mu 379(35[tC02e/gallofi 1 ] =_(_oe_.__[_ (3.5)[L 2 elgallonfuel A~ M [ ]fuel X I ]fuel X 106
Equation 3.1 can then be rewritten as
GHGabatement cost'X - Cost (3.6)
tCze/gallonconventional jet fuel-tC0 2 e/gallonrenewable jet fuel,x
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Dividing equation 3.6 by the LC-GHG emissions of conventional jet fuel yields
GHGabatement cost cost, Co2e (3.7)
gaoneeal jet fuel x
tCO2 e/gallonconventional jet fuel* (1- tC en e
conventional jet fuel
tCO2 e
ere tCaonrenewable jet fuel is a metric of normalized GHG emissions of a renewable jet
gallonconventional jet fuel
fuel type relative to conventional jet fuel, and is written as AGHGx. In this work I use an
average value of conventional jet fuel LC-GHG emissions from Stratton et al. (2010) of
about 0.011 tCO2e/gallon (87.5g CO2e/MJ). I name this variable K. Stratton finds that K
varies between 80.7 gCO2e/MJ for jet fuel from US crude oil, and 109.3 gCO2e/MJ for
jet fuel from hydroprocessed Nigerian crude oil (see Stratton et al. (2010), Table 8, page
14). In a study done by the National Energy and Technology Laboratory (NETL) (Skone,
2008), LC-GHG emissions of conventional jet fuel were found to be 88.0 gCO2e/MJ.
This variance in LC-GHG emissions per MJ has a small linear impact on K. Following
Stratton et al. (2010), I use the baseline value of K as the reference value. Using the
metrics defined above, equation 3.7 can be rewritten as:
GHGabatement cost,x[$/tC0 2 e] _ K AGHGx)' (3.8)
3.2.2 The Social Cost of Carbon, Renewable Jet Fuel Premium and LC-GHG
emissions
In the US, Executive Order 12866 requires agencies "to assess both the costs and the
benefits of the intended regulation" (IWG, 2010). Renewable jet fuels currently have a
higher cost than conventional jet fuels (Dynamic Fuels, 2012), and therefore the benefits
need to be assessed in relation to the cost. Societal benefits from renewable jet fuel are
derived primarily from abatement in GHG emissions compared to conventional fuel.
Their higher cost implies a cost of abatement. As long as renewable jet fuels are more
expensive than conventional jet fuel, there will be such a cost of abatement. To compare
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the cost of GHG abatement of renewable jet fuels to societal benefits derived from GHG
abatement, the EPA recommends comparing abatement cost to the Social Cost of Carbon
(IWG, 2010) or the cost to society of climate change damage. While SCC refers solely to
carbon (in the form of carbon dioxide), many recent estimates, and the estimates I use,
use the term SCC but refer to all greenhouse gas emissions. IPCC (2007b) defines SCC
as ''an estimate of the economic value of the extra (or marginal) impact caused by the
emission of one more tonne of carbon (in the form of carbon dioxide) at any point in
time". The SCC can be understood as an estimate of the monetized damages associated
with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year. SCC can therefore be
used to monetize and quantify benefits from avoided GHG emissions.
Estimating the SCC generally involves assigning a monetary value to all impacts of a
tonne of GHG emitted in the present, taking into account atmospheric residence time and
discounting to the year of emission (IPCC, 2007b). The SCC is intended to include both
economic and natural damages such as changes in net agricultural productivity, human
health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services
due to climate change (IWG, 2010).
There is great uncertainty in estimating future climate activity, future economic
activity, and relating future costs to present value. The IPCC (2007b) acknowledges that
high uncertainties such as "climate sensitivity, response lags, discount rates, the treatment
of equity, the valuation of economic and non-economic impacts, and the treatment of
possible catastrophic losses" remain. Downing et al. (2005) reported that a survey of
fourteen experts in estimating the SCC rated their estimates as low confidence, due to the
many gaps in the coverage of impacts and valuation studies, uncertainties in projected
climate change, choices in the decision framework and the applied discount rate.
Tol (2003) estimates the SCC using 88 estimates of the marginal costs of carbon
dioxide emissions from 22 published studies, combined to form a probability density
function. He found the mode at $5/tC, the mean at $104/tC, and the 95 percentile at
$446/tC. (1$/tCO 2 , 30$/tCO 2 and 127 $/tCO 2 respectively9 ). Tol (2005) updated this
range to 14-350 US$/tC (4-95 US$/tCO 2) (median and 95th percentile estimates). The
9 The SCC is reported either as the cost per metric ton of carbon emissions or the cost per metric ton of
carbon dioxide emissions. The multiplier for translating between mass of CO 2 and the mass of carbon is
3.67 (the molecular weight of CO 2 divided by the molecular weight of carbon = 44/12 =3.67).
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IPCC's most recent report on the SCC from Climate Change 2007: Working Group III:
Mitigation of Climate Change uses the Tol (2005) values of between 4 and 95 US$/tCO 2.
(Stern, 2007), reports a SCC of US$304/tC (US$85/tCO 2) using the PAGE model 0 .
As stated above, in the US, Executive Order 12866 requires US agencies "to
assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation" (IWG, 2010). The EPA
presents the SCC in the 2010 US Government Interagency Report (IWG, 2010) to allow
agencies to incorporate the social benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. EPA
relies on three most frequently cited integrated assessment model (IAMs) to estimate the
SCC: FUND, DICE and PAGE" EPA results for 2010 indicate values of the SCC at
between 4.7$/tCO 2 and 64.9$/tCO 2, with values rising as high as $136.2/tCO 2 by 2050
(IWG, 2010).
More recent estimates of the SCC are 100$/tCO2 (Hope, 2011) and $128/tCO 2
(Pycroft, 2011). Pycroft also gives a range of $5 - $564 (5-95th percentiles).
For the purposes of this thesis, I use a range of values for the SCC of $25/tCO2e
as a low estimate, $100/tCO 2e as a mid range estimate and 175$/tCO 2e as a high
estimate. I choose this range to take account of the current uncertainty in SCC and
mitigation cost estimates, with most estimates having a skewed probability density
function (with a higher probability of values of SCC greater than the mode) (IWG, 2010),
the upward trend of the majority of SCC estimates' 2 and taking into account these
estimates will be updated as the science and economics of climate change develops.
In the next section I use equation 3.8 to relate the SCC to literature and industry
estimates of renewable fuel price premium for different fuel LC-GHG emissions
reductions. I then estimate theoretical price premium goals for different fuel LC-GHG
emissions reductions.
10 The PAGE (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect) model by Chris Hope (Hope, 2008)
" The DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy) by William Nordhaus (e.g. Nordhaus et al.
2000), The FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution) model, by Richard
Tol (e.g. Tol, 2006).
12 In general, SCC over time tends to increase since future emissions could create larger incremental
damage with physical and economic systems becoming more stressed (IWG, 2008)
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3.2.3 Deriving Renewable Jet Fuel Cost Premium Goals Using the Social Cost of
Carbon
As stated above, I use the SCC as an estimate of the benefits of avoided GHG emissions.
In this section I relate the SCC to the cost of renewable jet fuel production. Using this
relationship, it is possible to define goals for different types of renewable jet fuel cost
premium over conventional jet fuel, the aim for the industry, policy makers and airlines
being that the GHG abatement cost of fuel type x is less than or equal to the SCC. This
can be written as shown in equation 3.9.
GHGabatement cost,x [$/tC02e] SCC [$/tCO2e] (3.9)
For fuels that have well quantified LC-GHG emissions reduction, equation 3.9
can be rearranged to relate the SCC and the fuel's LC-GHG emissions reduction to the
fuel's cost-effective cost premium. Here cost-effective means that the higher cost of the
renewable fuel offsets future avoided climate damages because of the fuel's lower LC-
GHG emissions compared to conventional jet fuel. Therefore from a societal perspective,
the extra cost of the renewable jet fuel is cost-effective if the following conditions are
met:
GHGabatement cost,x SCC
ACostx SCC * K * (1 - AGHG,) (3.10)
Equation 3.10 links the GHG abatement cost and SCC to the cost premium and
LC-GHG emissions of a renewable fuel. The equation forms a three dimensional space,
with a linear relationship between abatement cost and renewable fuel price premium, and
a hyperbolic relationship between abatement cost and LC-GHG emissions reduction
normalized to conventional jet fuel. Figure 5 shows equation 3.8 in two dimensions, for
different values of AGHGX. Additionally, SCC estimates are plotted.
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Figure 5. GHG abatement cost as a function of renewable fuel price premium for different AGHG
AGHGX values of between 0 (100% life cycle reduction) and 0.6 (40% reduction) were
chosen. This range approximately represents the range of fuels identified by Stratton et
al. (2010) that have a baseline LC-GHG emissions reduction less than conventional jet
fuel. Moreover, the upper bound falls close to the RFS2 classification of advanced
biofuel, the category under which renewable jet fuel falls (EISA, 2007).
Using the estimates of low, average and high SCC discussed above, figure 5 or
equation 3.10, can be used to estimate theoretical renewable jet fuel cost premium goals
for different LC-GHG emissions reductions. For example, using the average SCC of
100$/tCO 2e, the renewable jet fuel cost-effective cost premium (taking into account the
societal damages of GHG emissions), ranges between 40 cents and $1.2, depending on
selected LC-GHG reductions. For a $200/tCO2e SCC, the range increases to between $1
and $2.40. In other words for a renewable jet fuel, such as soy oil to HEFA renewable jet
fuel, which has an estimated LC-GHG emissions reduction of -60% for a no-land-use
change scenario (Stratton et al., 2010) the renewable jet fuel could be between 20 cents
and $1.4 more expensive than conventional jet fuel, and still be cost-effective from a
societal perspective.
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Equation 3.10 and figure 5 represents the generalized relationship between
renewable jet fuel cost premium, LC-GHG reductions and the SCC. As knowledge of
these three variables improves, equation 3.10 can be used to re-evaluate cost-effective
renewable jet fuel options.
3.2.4 Estimating renewable jet fuel cost premium goals using the SCC
In this section I use SCC estimates and renewable jet fuel LC-GHG emissions from
Stratton et al. (2010) and Carter (forthcoming) to calculate cost-premium goals for
different renewable jet fuel pathways. I compare theses goals to current literature and
industry cost estimates of renewable jet fuel as an indication of where the industry should
be aiming for mature cost-effective renewable jet fuel production. I also calculate the
GHG abatement cost of renewable jet fuel pathways that have both cost and LC-GHG
emissions reduction estimates publicly available.
Equation 3.10 can be solved for specific estimates of renewable jet fuel LC-GHG
emissions and SCC. The value obtained, ACostx, indicates the cost-effective cost
premium for renewable jet fuel type x. I use LC-GHG emissions estimates from Stratton
et al. (2010) for 26 renewable jet fuel feedstock/ production/ land-use-change (LUC)
combinations. I use estimates from Carter (forthcoming) for LC-GHG estimates of algae
from 'Open Pond Wet' and 'Flat Panel Wet', the two production pathways identified by
Carter that have LC-GHG emissions less than conventional jet fuel.
Stratton et al. (2010) list 'low', 'baseline' and 'high' LC-GHG estimates for each
renewable jet fuel production/feedstock combination as well as for conventional jet fuel.
The three values are based on well-to-wake 3 emissions, and exclude LUC factors. LUC
is taken into account for different production/feedstock combinations with a unique
estimate for each LUC scenario. Table 4 (from Stratton et al. (2010)) shows assumptions
made for each LUC scenario.
13 Where well-to-wake refers to GHG emissions from extraction to aircraft tank, plus combustion
emissions.
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Table 4. Land use change scenarios (Stratton et al., 2010, pg 96).
Land use Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
change ______
Carbon depleted
Switchgrass None soils converted to n/a n/aswitchgrass
cultivation
Grassland Tropical rainforest
Soy oil None conversion to conversion to n/a
soybean field soybean field
Tropical rainforest Peat landLogged over forest conversion to rainforest
Palm oil None conversion to palm . conversion to
plantation field palm ntation palm plantation
field
Rapeseed Set-aside landNone converted to n/a n/a
oil rapeseed cultivation
Desert land
Salicornia None salicornia liation n/a n/a
field
Similarly, Carter (forthcoming) gives a 'baseline', 'negative error' and 'positive error' for
each algae fuel LC-GHG emissions estimates. For a given SCC estimate, a cost premium
goal is calculated using equation 3.10. Results are plotted in figure 6. Baseline values
(shown by the red point) are calculated using baseline LC-GHG emissions for
conventional jet fuel and renewable jet fuel. The error bars represent high and low
estimates of renewable jet fuel LC-GHG emissions compared to baseline conventional jet
fuel LC-GHG emissions (following Stratton et al. (2010)). I use the medium SCC value
of $1 00/tCO 2e for all figure 6 estimates (for the full range of combinations, please see
appendix I).
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1+H Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PO)
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It1 Jatropha oil to HRJ
F1- Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P1)
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HO)
--- -Algae oil to HRJ
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel w/o CCS
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RO)
-- -- Algae Open Pond Wet
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Crude to conventional jet fuel
Crude to ULS jet fuel
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Figure 6. Societal Cost-Effective Renewable Jet Fuel Cost Premium Goals.
Figure 6 shows the results of applying equation 3.10 to the Stratton et al. (2010)
and Carter (forthcoming) estimates. Cost premium goals range from about negative $8
for Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P3) to about a $1.50 premium for Switchgrass to F-T fuel
(LUC-B 1). Negative values indicate that LC-GHG emissions are higher than
conventional jet fuel. Therefore, in terms of the SCC, these fuels need to be cheaper than
conventional jet fuel because of damages from extra GHG emissions. Positive cost
premium values indicate fuels that have a savings in GHG emissions, and therefore can
be more expensive than conventional jet fuel and still be cost-effective from a societal
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perspective. Large error bar values indicate high levels of uncertainty in GHG emissions.
Renewable fuel producers, airlines and policy makers can use figure 6 to determine
renewable jet fuel cost premium goals.
It is possible to compare the goals shown in figure 6 to current renewable jet fuel
price estimates from the literature and industry. Such a comparison needs to be
interpreted carefully given the infancy of the renewable jet fuel industry, and the paucity
of renewable jet fuel price estimates. However, the estimates provide a starting point for
assessing the current cost-effectiveness of the renewable jet fuel industry. All
assumptions are noted. Theoretical cost estimates are taken from Pearlson (2011) for
HEFA from soy oil, Bredehoeft et al. (2011) for biomass to liquid (BTL) via F-T, and
Carter (forthcoming) for HEFA from algae oil. Please note that Carter's algae to HEFA
numbers take into account all capital and operating expenses but do not include a return
on investment, as modeled in Pearlson's soy oil to HEFA numbers. The inclusion of a
return on investment would marginally increase the price reported in figure 7. Pearlson
uses five-year average feedstock prices to a estimate baseline soy to HEFA price.
Feedstock cost makes up the majority of Pearlson's estimates. I therefore use five year
average conventional jet fuel prices from EIA (2012). This estimate is shown in table 5
below. I estimate the cost premium of soy to HEFA based on current feedstock prices and
the current price of conventional jet fuel using linear interpolation from results in table
6.7, page 75 of Pearlson (2011). This value is shown in figure 7. Industry prices are taken
from the only current commercial US producer of renewable jet fuel, Dynamic Fuels
(2012) for HEFA from animal fat based on average quarter 3 2011 prices. I include the
price of soy methyl ester biodiesel over the same period for comparative purposes. Table
5 and 6 outline source and assumptions for each price.
53
Table 5. Literature Price Estimates: Assumptions and Sources.
Economic Delta LC-GHG
Pathway Source Price Assumption Source
Soy to HEFA (feedstock 5 5 year average: soybean oil price Stratton (2010),
year average) Pearlson, 2011 ($2.62), jet fuel price ($2.25) LUC SO
Soy to HEFA (feedstock Pearlson, 2011, 2012 for soybean oil price 4/2012 of Stratton (2010),
current) Worldbank, $4.29/gallon LUC SO
Biomass-to-liquid via F-T Bredehoeft, 2011 Stratton (2010),
Carter,
Algae Open Pond Wet Carter, Forthcoming Forthcoming
Carter,
Algae Flat Panel Wet Carter, Forthcoming Forthcoming
Table 6. Industry Price Estimates: Assumptions and Sources.
Price
Pathway Price Source Assumption Delta LC-GHG Source
Dynamic Fuels, Q3 2011
SME Biodiesel 2012 Average EPA, 2012
Dynamic Fuels, Q3 2011 Assume Same as soy
Animal Fat to HEFA 2012 Average HEFA
Cost estimates from sources shown in table 5 and 6 are plotted in figure 7, shown
by the green marks. Cost premium values are relative to the EIA Annual Energy Outlook
2012 reference jet fuel value of $3.08/gallon (EIA, 2012b). Only baseline values are
used. Please refer to appendix III for a range of estimates. It is important to note that the
green marks indicate renewable jet fuel price estimates, whereas the red marks indicate
societal cost-effective premiums for renewable jet fuel. Ideally, a renewable jet fuel cost
premium (green mark) should be less than or equal to the cost premium indicated by the
red marks in figure 6 and 7. Red marks indicate cost premium goals for a $1 00/tCO2e
SCC, as in figure 6. However, in figure 7 high error bars use a $175/tCO 2e SCC and low
bars use a $25/tCO 2e SCC. This extends the range of cost-premium values.
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1 I I Flat Panel Wet (Carter)
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
Biomass-to-liquid via F-T (Bredehoeft)
Animal Fat to HEFA (Dynamic Fuels)
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-B1)
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-H1)
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-BO)
Flat Panel Wet (Carter)
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PO)
I Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-SO)
Jatropha oil to HRJ
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-Pt)
M Social Pr ce Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HO)
Pre miun i Algae oil to HRJ
Go 1 -Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel w/o CCS
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RO)
S- -+-1 Open Pond Wet (Carter)
EL ratu e Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel with CCS
In ustry I Crude to conventional jet fuel
Pri e Crude to ULS jet fuel
Pre muin Coal to F-T fuel (with carbon capture)
Es imates Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-Si)
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-R1)
Natural gas to F-T fuel
Oil sands to jet fuel
Oil shale to jet fuel
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P2)
_-_- - i _ _Coal to F-T fuel (no carbon capture)
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Fuel Cost Premium [$/gallon]
Figure 7. Comparison of Industry and Literature Cost Estimates and Cost Premium Goals.
Figure 7 shows that for the range of SCC between $25-$175/tCO 2e, none of the
literature or industry prices are cost-effective. This is also shown in section 3.2.5 by
directly comparing abatement cost of renewable jet fuels to the SCC. Pearlson's (2011)
theoretical estimate of soy oil to HEFA renewable jet fuel using current feedstock prices
is the closest estimate to being cost effective. It is important to note that these cost
estimates are a snapshot of an emerging renewable jet fuel industry (Dynamic Fuels only
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began production in late 2010). This means that costs are likely to be reduced over time
through learning effects and competition. Figure 7 shows where the industry currently is,
and where it should aim as it matures.
3.2.5 Estimating renewable jet fuel GHG abatement costs
By combining literature and industry LC-GHG emissions and cost data estimates, it is
possible to use equation 3.8 to derive abatement costs for select renewable jet fuel
pathways. As with price estimates shown in figure 6, such estimates should be taken as a
very preliminary estimate of renewable jet fuel cost-effectiveness. The estimates and
assumptions from table 5 and 6 are used to calculate the baseline abatement costs shown
in table 7 and 8 for literature (theoretical) and industry (actual) abatement costs
respectively. Please refer to appendix III for a full range of estimate.
Table 7. Literature Estimates Results.
Price Price Premium Delta LC- Abatement Cost
Pathway [$/gal] [$/gal] GHG [$/tCO2e]
Soy to HEFA (feedstock 5 year
average) 3.98 1.73 0.41 253.83
Soy to HEFA (feedstock current) 5.78 2.70 0.41 398.16
Biomass-to-liquid via F-T 8.93 5.85 0.19 632.05
Algae Open Pond Wet 7.71 4.63 0.62 1066.54
Algae Flat Panel Wet 30.66 27.58 0.32 3516.92
Table 8. Industry Estimates Results.
Price Price Premium Delta LC- Abatement Cost
Pathway [$/gal] [$/gal] GHG [$/tCO2e]
SME Biodiesel 5.46 2.38 0.5 414.15
Animal Fat to HEFA 5.70 2.62 0.41 384.41
Estimating renewable jet fuel abatement cost in this form allows for direct
comparison to the SCC, as well as other estimates of abatement cost such as the carbon
price in the EU-ETS (Malina et al. 2012), renewable fuel abatement costs reported by
DEFRA (2008) and CBO (2010), US economy abatement costs such as in Morris (2008)
and industry abatement cost estimates such as Creyts (2007).
Table 7 and 8 shows that both literature and industry estimates of abatement costs
are above the high estimate of SCC at $175/tCO 2e. Further the abatement costs are far
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higher than the current abatement cost in the EU-ETS (as shown by the CO 2 allowance
price) at approximately $8/tCO 2 (WSJ, 2012). This suggests, as discussed above, that it is
cheaper for airlines to purchase EU emissions allowances than renewable jet fuel.
These estimates show that as the renewable jet fuel industry matures, it needs to
reduce cost premium relative to conventional jet fuel, or increase LC-GHG emissions
reductions. It is important to note that given the paucity of renewable jet fuel cost
estimates, the infancy of the industry and the uncertainty around the SCC value, table 7
and 8 should be taken as a very preliminary estimate of renewable jet fuel cost-
effectiveness.
3.2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this section I related renewable jet fuel cost premium and abatement cost to the
benefits of avoided climate damage or the SCC. An equation (3.10) was derived to
quantify cost premium goals for given LC-GHG emissions. For cost-effective GHG
mitigation, the marginal cost of GHG mitigation should be equal to the marginal benefits
of emissions reduction (IWG 2010, IPCC 2007b). IPCC (2007b), define the marginal
benefits as the avoided damages for an additional tonne of carbon, otherwise known as
the social cost of carbon (SCC). Despite uncertainty in analytic results of SCC, it is
possible to draw estimate from the literature, which I bound at $25/tCO2e at the low end,
$100/tCO 2 e as a mid-range estimate and $175/tCO2 as a high estimate. I use the SCC to
estimate societal cost-effective renewable jet fuel price premiums, shown in figure 6.
Values range between 42 cents for Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel with carbon capture
and sequestration and $1.17 for switchgrass to F-T with carbon depleted soils turned to
switchgrass cultivation.
Further, I compare literature and industry estimates of renewable jet fuel price to
compare the above goals to current prices. I find that no renewable jet fuel pathways
examined are currently cost-effective. I also calculate renewable jet fuel abatement cost,
with the same result. These results suggest that the emerging industry (the first plant in
the US started production in 2010) must aim to reduce fuel cost, or decrease LC-GHG
emissions, as the industry matures. Further, it suggests that it is cheaper for airlines to
purchase EU emissions allowances at ~8/tCO 2e than purchase renewable jet fuel with a
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current abatement cost close to ~$400/tCO2e. This result holds irrespective of EU ruling
on biomass emissions factor, as discussed in chapter 2.
Calculating the GHG abatement cost of renewable jet fuels also allows for
comparison to the CO 2 allowance price in a US emissions trading scheme. Winchester et
al. (2011) model the impact of the now defunct Waxman-Markey Bill (H.R. 2454, 2009)
on the US airline industry. The chief emissions reduction instrument in H.R. 2454 is a
cap-and-trade system that would cover between 85% and 90% of all U.S. emissions. The
cap would have been gradually tightened through 2050. It is 80% of 2005 emissions (5.6
gigatons, Gt, of C02-e) in 2020, 58% (4.2 Gt) in 2030, and 17% (1.2 Gt) in 2050. The
CO2 allowance cost is found to be between $7.27 and $22.25/tCO2e in 2015 depending
on whether aviation CO 2 emissions have a multiplicative factor because of the additional
impact of high altitude emissions, rising to between $28.69 and $87.08/tCO 2e. The
conclusion can be drawn that if renewable jet fuels do not get cheaper in terms of
abatement cost, it would be cheaper for airlines (and more cost-effective from a societal
perspective) to be part of an emissions trading scheme such as H.R. 2454, than purchase
renewable jet fuel.
Of course this result is dependent on future renewable jet fuel prices, which are
difficult to forecast. For a full analysis of aviation abatement cost options, the above
values should be compared to other abatement cost estimates such as Kar (2010) who
identifies seven abatement options including: Weight - reduce the aircraft's empty weight
and the payload mass. Engine Efficiency - reduce the specific fuel consumption by
improving the engine efficiency, such as through higher bypass ratios. Aerodynamics -
increase the lift to drag ratio. Average Load Factor - fill flights with more passengers
and cargo. Fleet Mix - use larger aircraft that take advantage of scale economies to be
more efficient on a seat-mile or ton-mile basis. Flight Distance - modify network
topology to reduce connections and improve air traffic control procedures to reduce flight
distances. Cruise Speed - operate at cruise speeds that minimize fuel burn.
Further, it is likely that as the renewable jet fuel industry matures, production costs
will decrease. Evidence includes the well-documented learning effect. As an industry
matures, the average marginal cost of production is expected to decrease. For example,
Dynamic Fuels has seen an 84% reduction in operating costs since production began in
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2010 (Dynamic Fuels, 2012). Also, the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS, 2011)
estimates that by 2017, soy biodiesel will be equal to the cost of conventional diesel. This
estimate is based on an increasing petroleum fuel price, and decreasing soy oil prices.
This implies that by 2017, soy oil to HEFA will also be a cost effective means of GHG
mitigation. Rising petroleum based fuel prices (EIA, 2011) will reduce the price premium
of renewable jet fuels, while IPCC estimate that the SCC will grow at about 2.4% p.a.
meaning, increasing the benefits of GHG mitigation.
Stern (2007) argues for government intervention when obstacles that hinder the
development of low carbon/renewable technologies exist. The extent to which an obstacle
of technology development applies to biofuels and justifies a mandate is unclear.
Finally, unlike the EU, where renewable fuel legislation is directly aimed at GHG
mitigation, in the US, GHG mitigation is one of many goals, the primary being Energy
Independence and Security, as well as agricultural development (IESA, 2007). For
example Oak Ridge National Lab (Leiby, 2007) estimates that benefits of renewable fuel
other than GHG abatement range from $6.71 - $23.25 $/barrel or ~30c/gallon.
The above reasons indicate that with investment, some renewable jet fuels could
over time be a cost-effective GHG mitigation strategy, and current high costs do not
justify nonaction. However, the analysis shows that at current prices and LC-GHG
emissions factors, renewable jet fuels still have some way to go before they fall within
the range of accepted SCC. Further, the analysis shows that at current renewable jet fuel
prices, it is cheaper for airlines to purchase emissions allowances in the EU, or in a
emissions trading scheme such as H.R. 2454, than purchase renewable jet fuel.
3.3 The Impact of a renewable jet fuel mandate on US aviation
3.3.1 Introduction
The Renewable Fuels Standard II as legislated in the 2007 Energy Independence and
Security Act mandates blending requirements for gasoline and diesel fuels (EISA, 2007).
Although never publicly stated, in the future this legislation could theoretically be
changed to include blending requirements for jet fuel. The magnitude of such a blending
mandate is modeled using renewable jet fuel goals set by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), taking into account goals set by the US NAVY and the USAF.
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In this section I discuss the impact of a hypothetical jet fuel-blending mandate on
the US aviation industry. In section 3.3.2 I discuss certain points of interest for renewable
jet fuel production and adoption if no mandate comes online before 2022, a scenario I call
reference. In particular I discuss the production of HEFA, which can be used as a
renewable jet fuel (UOP, 2005), and biodiesel, which cannot (Hileman et al., 2009), to
meet part of the RFS2 mandate. In section 3.3.3 I define and apply a heuristic model to
assess the impact of a renewable jet fuel mandate on US aviation.
A plausible, but not necessary, mechanism for mandating the above goals could
be implementation through the RFS2 and administration by the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)14 . Another plausible scenario could be cost-effective renewable
jet fuel adoption within the framework of an emissions trading scheme. When the GHG
abatement cost of renewable jet fuel is less than the CO2 price, companies would turn to
renewable jet fuel as the cheapest option. In this section I focus on a mandate similar to
the RFS2, but discuss cost-effective renewable jet fuel adoption in later sections. Please
see Appendix I for a detailed description of the RFS2. Obligated parties (refineries and
importers of petroleum based fuel) under the new RFS2 would be required to blend
gasoline, diesel and jet fuel in proportions determined by the EPA. Renewable
Identification Numbers (RINs) are already issued for the production of renewable jet fuel.
Obligated parties would be required to purchase either renewable jet fuel with attached
RINs or the equivalent number of separated RINs to meet their blending volume
obligation. As with the existing RFS2, the price premium for renewable fuel, or RIN
price, would presumably be passed from producers to refineries and importers through
the mandate. The cost would then be passed through to the consumer (in this case airlines
and finally passengers) in the form of increased jet fuel prices". Jet fuel prices per gallon
would increase by the RIN price (the price premium of renewable fuel), less any tax
credit, multiplied by the blend ratio (where the blend ratio is the mandate in a given year
divided by the total jet fuel consumption in that year).
I model the hypothetical jet fuel blending mandate using three published goals:
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) goal of one billion gallons of renewable jet
14Note that there are numerous other forms of implementation, such as a mandate administered outside of
the EPA.
15 Please see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of cost pass through behavior.
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fuel per year from 2018 onwards, as outlined in the FAA Destination 2025 (FAA, 2011),
the USAF goal to cover 50% of USAF domestic aviation via 50:50 alternative fuel blends
cost competitive acquisition from domestic sources by 2016 (USAF, 2010) and the US
Navy goal to have half of its total energy consumption afloat from alternative sources by
2020 (USNAVY, 2010). It is important to note that the above three goals are all goals,
and therefore do not mandate blending requirements for jet fuel. However, they provide a
starting point for this analysis to assess the impact of a renewable jet fuel mandate. The
magnitude of the USAF and NAVY goals are shown in figure 9, as reported in Carter et
al. (2011).
E RFS2 Advanced
Biofuel less aviation
0 .29 Civil Aviation
0 Navy
Figure 8. RFS2 Mandated Advanced Biofuel in 2018 [billion gallons] including assumed civil mandate
scenario. (Data from Carter et al. 2011)
Based on these estimates, I set up three scenarios, shown in table 6. The first is
the 'Reference Scenario'. This scenario is business as usual, or the scenario where no
renewable jet fuel mandate is legislated before 2022. The next two scenarios are
scenarios where a renewable jet fuel mandate is legislated. There is considerable
uncertainty around such a renewable jet fuel mandate: the quantity of the mandate, the
types of renewable jet fuels that would be available for airline use, the cost of such fuels
and the LC-GHG emissions of such fuels. To take into account the uncertainty around the
magnitude of the mandate, I define two scenarios 6 : the Civil Scenario and the Civil Less
Military Scenario. In the Civil Scenario, I use the magnitude of the FAA goal of one
16 The other uncertainties are discussed and modeled in section 3.3.3.
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billion gallons of renewable jet fuel per year by 2018 for use by civil aviation. In terms of
the FAA goal, which is politically unrelated to any mandate, the stated one billion gallons
includes the USAF and the NAVY goals 7 . I therefore assume a second scenario, Civil
less Military, in which I use the mandate of the FAA goal, less the magnitude of the
estimated NAVY and USAF usage. These estimates are shown in table 6.
Table 9. Scenarios.
Civil Aviation
Mandate [billion
Scenario gallons/year] Start Date
Reference Scenario 0 -
Civil Scenario 1 2018
Civil less Military Scenario 0.33 2018
Below I discuss the reference scenario, before going into the modeling approach and
results.
3.3.2 The Reference Scenario
There are numerous renewable jet fuels that could possibly be produced in the next
decade. A non-exhaustive list includes HEFA from soy oil, animal fat, jatropha or algae
or BTL via F-T from numerous cellulosic sources such as forest residues. See Hileman et
al. (2009, 2011), UOP (2007), OECD (2012) and Carter (forthcoming) for a more
complete list of possible fuels. All of these fuels could be used as either renewable jet
fuel or diesel (depending on the chemical composition of the fuel) under the RFS2, and
therefore could theoretically be produced to meet the gasoline and diesel blending
mandates (EPA, 2012b). Predicting which of these fuels will be produced under the RFS2
means forecasting legislative factors, loans, costs and competitors, amongst numerous
other variables. This makes accurate prediction of which renewable jet fuels will be
produced very challenging. However, in the absence of a renewable jet fuel mandate, and
with the current higher costs of renewable jet fuel compared to conventional jet fuel (see
section 3.2), it is unlikely that renewable jet fuel would be used by airlines, but rather as
diesel or gasoline which have mandated blending requirements.
17 Personal correspondence with the FAA, November 2011.
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Nevertheless, I focus on one aspect of a reference scenario: whether HEFA from
animal fat (I also consider HEFA from soy oil) is likely to be produced over biodiesel
under current legislation. This is an interesting question because HEFA from animal fat is
currently the only renewable jet fuel being produced in the US. Dynamic Fuels in
Giesmar, Louisiana, began construction in 2007 of a 75 million gallons per year HEFA
plant with chicken fat as a feedstock from Tyson Chickens. Construction was completed
in 2010 and in 2011 the plant was operating at full capacity (Dynamic Fuels 2012).
Further, literature estimates from Pearlson (2011) suggest that HEFA from soy oil is
currently estimated to be the lowest cost pathway for renewable jet fuel production. What
makes this question more interesting is that biodiesel, or fatty acid methyl ester (FAME)
competes with HEFA in the biomass-based diesel category of the RFS2 (these are the
only fuels currently being produced in this category), and both these fuels fall under the
advanced undifferentiated biofuel category. See Appendix I for more details of this
categorization. The question I therefore set out to address is whether FAME or HEFA is
likely to be produced in larger quantities under current legislation. Figure 10 shows
historic production, imports, exports and consumption of FAME and HEFA in the US.
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Figure 9. FAME and HEFA in the US (Data from EIA, 2012a).
HEFA also competes with FAME for feedstock (vegetable, plant oils, and waste
grease, and in the future algae oil). However, these two fuels have very different
production processes and result in very different fuels. FAME is made by reacting fatty
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acids derived from vegetable oils or animal fat with methanol or ethanol (a short chain
mono-alkyl ester) to form esters of long chain fatty acids, and glycerin (used in soap
production) through transesterification (Knothe, 2010), while HEFA is made through
hydroprocessing (UOP, 2005). These two processes are depicted in the flowchart in
figure 11.
Glycerol
Biodiesel (fatty acid alkyl
Transestenfication: esters) combustionAlcohol, catals
Vegetable oil / Exhaust emissions
animal fat (combustion products)
Hydrodeoxygenation EgncmutionH catalyst Renewable diesel ustion
(hydrocarbons)
Propane, water, carbon
dioxide
Figure 10. Flow chart for transformation of lipid materials to products of engine combustion (Knothe,
2010).
In 2001, FAME was defined by the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) as D6751, or biodiesel. As of March 2012, there are 148 biodiesel plants with
annual production capacity of 1.4 billion gallons (NBB, 2012). FAME has a different
chemical composition than petroleum-based diesel, known as ASTM D975, primarily in
that 11% of its composition is oxygen. This has two main negative implications. The first
is that FAME has a much higher cloud point than petroleum based fuel, and so cannot be
used in high blend ratios in cold climates, and in aircraft, because it effectively freezes.
The second is that FAME is hydrophilic, meaning that it mixes with water. This means
that it cannot be transported by traditional infrastructure such as pipelines because FAME
risks picking up water and the mixture contaminating jet fuel (Hileman et al. 2009). On
the other hand, HEFA fuel is a synthetic fuel in that it has virtually the same chemical
composition as petroleum based diesel and jet fuel. HEFA is defined as ASTM D975, and
can be used in its pure form (in diesel engines). Part of the HEFA product slate is jet fuel.
HEFA jet fuel has recently been approved by ASTM for use in jet engines up to a blend
ratio of 50%.
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In the literature, Knothe (2010) directly compares FAME and HEFA in terms of
cost, environmental factors, energy content and fuel composition. Knothe concludes that
both fuels have unique applications, namely, HEFA for jet fuel and compatibility with
existing infrastructure and FAME in terms of its lubricity and environmental benefits. I
add to this study by looking at an additional factor: a possible blend wall constraint for
FAME due to infrastructure incompatibility. I also review literature estimates of the cost
of FAME and HEFA to assess which fuel is likely to be produced in greater quantities.
3.3.2.1 FAME blend wall and Infrastructure Compatibility
As discussed above, FAME has different chemical properties than Diesel (D975) and so
is not suitable for use in its pure form in diesel engines (Hileman, 2009, UOP, 2008).
FAME (ASTM 6751) is usually blended with petroleum-based diesel (ASTM D975).
There is therefore a limit to the maximum amount of FAME that can be consumed in the
US, which is a function of total diesel consumption and the FAME blend ratio. The blend
ratio can be calculated by finding the percentage of diesel engine manufactures that
warranty FAME use, finding out what blend ratio they warrantee, and combining these
numbers to find an aggregate blend ratio for the US. The National Biodiesel Board (NBB,
2012) reports that all major original equipment manufacturer (OEMs) in the U.S. market
support B5 (5% blend of FAME and 95% conventional diesel) and lower blends,
provided they are made with FAME meeting ASTM D675 1. The NBB also reports that
more than 60% of U.S. manufacturers support B20 (20% FAME, 80% petroleum diesel)
or higher biodiesel blends in at least some of their equipment and that several more
OEMs are completing testing and progressing toward support for B20 (Audi and
Volkswagen) now that ASTM standards for B6-B20 blends have been published (ASTM
D7467). The blend wall in year y can be calculated by solving equation 3.11
FBL(y) = B5% * 0.05 * dc(y) + B20% * 0.2 * dc(y) (3.11)
where FBL is the FAME blend limit in year y, B5% is the fraction of the US market that
can use B5, B2% is the fraction of the US market that can use B20 and dc is the projected
US diesel consumption, y is the year. A blending constraint under RFS2 could arise if
FBL(y) < Advanced biofuel mandate (y). Using diesel consumption data from EIA
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(AEO, 2012) and plotting equation 3.11 over time, shown in figure 12, it can be seen that
the RFS2 mandate is always lower than the B5 and B21 blend wall, or FBL(y) >>
advanced biofuel mandate(y).
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Figure 11. Biodiesel (FAME) Blend Wall Schematic.
Only in the case where only B5 is guaranteed by OEMs does a blending constraint arise.
However, this is not the current situation (NBB, 2012). Therefore a blending constraint is
unlikely to be a limitation to future FAME production. Note that while the theoretical
FAME blend wall might not be a limitation to FAME in terms of the RFS2, FAME's
incompatibility with existing infrastructure and feedstock supply constraints (discussed
below) are likely to limit large-scale distribution.
3.3.2.2 Cost of FAME v. HEFA
If FAME or HEFA have a clear cost advantage, it would be likely that the lower
cost fuel would be produced to meet the biomass based diesel and on into the
undifferentiated advanced biofuel goal, taking into account feedstock and other
limitations (see Appendix I). Several studies suggest that HEFA has lower capital and
operating costs compared to FAME. Notably in 2005, UOP released a report for the US
Department of Energy reporting HEFA as having lower capital and operating costs
(UOP, 2005). Findings by Arena (2006) also suggest that HEFA is cheaper and in 2007
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the US National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL, 2007) released a report citing Arena's
findings. In an internal PARTNER paper, Pearlson (2011) found that HEFA from soy
was 15% cheaper than FAME. However, these results are within a 30% margin of error,
making exact comparison difficult. Theoretical work by Stumborg et al. (1996) also
suggests that HEFA is cheaper, although no details on the nature of the process or the
catalyst are offered. However, Knothe, (2010) concludes that there is not enough industry
data for HEFA to accurately determine its cost. Further, the price of HEFA sold by the
only US producer, Dynamic Fuels, cost $5.70 in quarter 3 of 2011, compared to FAME's
average cost at $5.46 over the same period.
Based on these literature and industry estimates, it seems likely that the HEFA
production process is cheaper than FAME. As Dynamic Fuels and other HEFA plants (in
particular HEFA from soy oil and then algae) come online, the cost of production will
likely decrease.
3.3.2.3 Other literature on the future of FAME and HEFA production
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts (EIA, 2011) that FAME
(biodiesel) production will hold constant at approximately 2 billion gallons per annum
beyond 2022 (approximately the current FAME capacity in the US). The reason cited is
supply constraints of soy oil and animal fat.' 8 EIA project that by 2022, 1.69 billion
gallons per year of biomass-derived liquid fuels will be produced, as seen in figure 12.
18 Personal communication with Mac J. Statton (mac.statton@eia.gov, 202-586-7105)
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Figure 12. RFS2 2010-2035 and EIA forecasts. (EIA, 2012a).
EIA defines biomass-derived liquid fuels to include pyrolysis oils, biomass derived
Fischer-Tropsch liquids, and renewable feedstocks used for the production of green diesel
(HEFA). From the EIA estimate, it appears that animal fat and soy limitations will limit
both the production of FAME and HEFA from these feedstocks. Alternative HEFA
feedstocks such as algae, or pyrolysis oils, could therefore be used to meet the advanced
biofuel goal.
3.3.2.4 Conclusion
Based on the above discussion three conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, a FAME blend
wall is unlikely to be a direct limitation to FAME production. However, this does not
mean that FAME's incompatibility with existing infrastructure will not limit its
attractiveness and increase its cost. Secondly, literature estimates suggest that HEFA will
be cheaper, although current industry estimates show HEFA as more expensive. Finally,
literature estimates suggest that HEFA and FAME from animal fat and soy oil are likely
to be limited by feedstock availability. Adding these findings to Knothe (2010), it seems
likely that FAME will be used in small quantities as a lubricant and for its emissions
reduction in diesel engines, and HEFA will be developed for unique high quality fuel
purposes such as for military and commercial aviation. If new HEFA feedstocks such as
algae become prevalent, increase in production could be expected.
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3.3.3 Mandate Scenarios
In this section I define and apply a heuristic model of a renewable jet fuel mandate.
3.3.3.1 Methodology
A renewable jet fuel mandate would force blending of renewable jet fuel with
conventional jet fuel. See section 3.1 for a brief discussion of how this could be
implemented. Assuming that renewable jet fuel is more expensive than conventional jet
fuel, a renewable jet fuel mandate would have the effect of increasing jet fuel prices. The
effective increase in jet fuel prices can be calculated by multiplying the price premium of
renewable jet fuel over conventional jet fuel, by the mandate divided by total US jet fuel
consumption (blend ratio), as shown in equation 3.12
AJetmandate scenario,y = (PRF - PCF)y * BR, (3.12)
where BR is the blend ratio, PRF is the price of renewable jet fuel, PCF is the price of
conventional jet fuel, y is the year, and AJetmandate scenario,y is the net increase in jet
fuel price in year y. The blend ratio in year y is found by dividing the civil scenario or the
civil less military scenario by the jet fuel consumption forecasts from the EIA Annual
Energy Outlook (2012b). Figure 14 shows the civil scenario and the civil less military
scenario, as well as the EIA forecast of jet fuel consumption as a function of time.
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Figure 13. Gallons of jet fuel consumed in the US and scenarios.
GHG abatement induced by the mandate can be calculated by subtracting GHG emissions
from the combustion of the mandated quantity of renewable jet fuel from the combustion
of the mandated quantity of conventional jet fuel, as shown in equation 3.13
CO 2 Abatement = Qmandate * LCGHGPF - Qmandate * LCGHGRF (3.13)
where LCGHGPF is the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of petroleum based jet fuel in
metric tonnes/gallon and LCGHGRF is the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of
renewable jet fuel in metric tonnes/gallon and Qmandate and the mandate quantity in
gallons.
3.3.3.2 Results
The effective increase in jet fuel price can be found by multiplying different renewable
fuel cost premiums in year y, by the blend ratio, as shown in equation 3.12. There is
much uncertainty around the production cost of renewable jet fuel. See section 3.2 for a
discussion of industry and literature estimates of current and future renewable jet fuel
production costs. I therefore use three different renewable fuel cost premiums ($0.2, $1.5S
and $3) as an illustration of different impacts. This illustrative range captures the average
2011 biomass based diesel RIN prices at $1.44 (ERS, 2011), a high estimate of
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production cost which includes Dynamic Fuel's (2012) production cost, Bredehoeft et
al.'s (2011) mid estimate for BTL and Carter's (forthcoming) estimate of algae, open
pond wet. The lower cost estimate could include a scenario where a new technology is
developed with lower costs, or current technology is improved.
The increases in jet fuel price for the civil scenario for the three different
renewable fuel price premiums are plotted in figure 15, as calculated per equation 3.12.
Jet fuel prices increase by between 3 and 12 cents per gallon.
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Figure 14. Increase in jet fuel price for different renewable fuel price premiums in the civil mandate
scenario.
The increase in jet fuel prices relative to the reference scenario decreases over time as a
result of forecast increases jet fuel consumption, as shown in figure 15, and the mandate
remaining constant. The effective jet fuel price in year y can then be found by adding the
delta increase in jet fuel price, AJetmandate scenario,y , to the reference jet fuel price. I use
the US EIA reference jet fuel price from the 2012 Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2012b).
The resting jet fuel prices for the civil scenario are plotted in figure 16.
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Figure 15. Civil scenario impacts on jet fuel prices.
Jet fuel prices rise by between 0.3-4.5% in 2018, as shown in figure 16, and table 7. In
the scenario civil less military the impact is approximately three times less than the civil
scenario as a result of the quantity of fuel mandated for civil aviation being three times
smaller, as shown in table 6.
Table 10. Results.
Blend Blend Increase in Jet fuel
Ratio 2018 Ratio 2022 Price, 2018, $1.5 Increase in Jet fuel Price,
Scenario [%] [%] Premium [%] 2022, $1.5 Premium [%]
Civil Mandate
Scenario 4.21 4.08 2.21 2.01
Civil less
Military
Mandate
Scenario 1.40 1.36 0.74 0.67
The environmental benefits derived from the mandate stem primarily from reductions in
GHG emissions 19. Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions (LC-GHG) of petroleum based jet
fuel and renewable jet fuel are used from Stratton et al (2010). The baseline value for
conventional jet fuel is used (87.50 gCO2e/MJ), which is equal to about 0.01
19 There are also environmental benefits in terms of potential decreases in other emissions such as
particulate matter and nitrous oxides as well as benefits from domestic fuel production. I do not quantify
the benefits achieved in terms of these elements in this thesis.
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tCO2e/gallon of jet fuel. Stratton's estimates of LC-GHG emissions for renewable jet
fuels vary widely depending on the production pathway, feedstock type, and land use
change. There is also uncertainty around which renewable jet fuels will be produced
between 2018 and 2022 (see section 3.2 for detailed discussion of this issue). I therefore
select a representative range of renewable jet fuel LC-GHG emissions to take account of
this uncertainty. At the high end, I use the EPA minimum percentage reduction on LC-
GHG emissions for advanced biofuel and biomass-based diesel, at 50% (EPA, 2012c).
This lies close to the range of soy to HEFA (60%), animal fat to HEFA (uncertain by
-50% as stated by EPA, 2012c), a medium algae estimate and a medium biomass to
liquid estimate, from Stratton et al. (2010). On the low end I choose a 90% reduction in
LC-GHG emissions, representing an optimistic estimate of biomass to liquid technology
and algae technology coming online to meet the mandate between 2018 and 2022. The
resulting reference and civil scenario GHG emissions are plotted in figure 17, with
percentage change relative to the reference plotted in figure 18.
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Figure 16. Reference and Civil Mandate Scenario GHG emissions for two estimates of LC-GHG.
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Figure 17. Percentage change between Reference and Civil Mandate Scenario GHG emissions for two
estimates of LC-GHG.
Results are tabulated and shown in table 8, for both the Civil Scenario and the Civil
Less Military Scenario and for both the 50% GHG emissions reduction scenario and the
90% emissions reduction scenario in 2018 and 2022.
Table 11. Scenario greenhouse gas emissions results.
Reference Policy GHG
GHG emissions GHG
emissions Policy GHG reduction Emissions
[million emissions [million Reduction rel.
Scenario tonnes] [million tonnes] tonnes] Reference [%]
Civil, 2018
90% LC-GHG 273.24 262.9 10.34 3.78
50% LC-GHG 273.24 267.49 5.75 2.10
Civil less Military, 2018
90% LC-GHG 273.24 269.79 3.45 1.26
50% LC-GHG 273.24 271.32 1.92 0.70
Civil, 2022
90% LC-GHG 281.83 271.49 10.34 3.67
50% LC-GHG 281.83 276.08 5.75 2.04
Civil less Military, 2022
90% LC-GHG 281.83 278.38 3.45 1.22
50% LC-GHG 281.83 279.91 1.92 0.68
As discussed above, the mandate remains constant, meaning that the emissions savings
remains constant. However, there is projected growth in baseline civil aviation traffic
(EIA, 2012b), which leads to a decrease in the GHG emissions reduction over time. The
74
V ke\ koo AI J-
IV- ev- ev, IV- ev rv 'V-'V-
A
results in table 8 show that there would be between a 2 and 3.8% decrease in GHG
emissions, for the civil scenario (1 billion gallons or renewable fuel per year) and
between a 0.6 and 1.3% decrease in GHG emissions for the civil less military scenario
(~333 million gallons of renewable fuel per year). This decrease in emissions would not
offset continued growth in GHG emissions, and by 2022, policy GHG emissions would
be larger than, or -equal to, 2018 reference emissions, and continue growing at the same
rate.
To offset the growth in emissions, the mandate would have to grow, as a
percentage of jet fuel consumption over time, at the same rate as forecast growth in fuel
consumption. However, the mandate achieves noticeable reductions in GHG emissions,
with a relatively small impact on jet fuel prices (-4.5% with the high renewable fuel price
premium of $3). Translating this increase in jet fuel price to a reduction in demand is
possible using price elasticity of demand (PED) estimates. Using a conservative estimate
of PED of -1 (Gillen et al., 2008) and assuming airline fuel costs at around 25% of total
operating costs (ATA, 2008), the above increase in fuel price would results in a decrease
in airline revenue tonne kilometers (RTK) of between about 1% and 0.1%
It is important to note that the above analysis does not say anything about how
expensive this option of GHG mitigation is for airlines relative to other GHG mitigation
options. In other words, the rational airline would presumably want to abate GHG at the
lowest cost in a set of available options. Options may include paying for GHG emissions
credits in an emissions trading scheme, such as the EU-ETS (Malina et al., 2012), or
reducing cruise speed to optimal fuel consumption performance, at the cost of longer total
flight times (Kar, 2010). Results from section 3.2 show where renewable jet fuels should
be aiming in terms of cost and GHG emissions for cost-effective abatement. Results in
section 3.3 show the impact of a mandate.
3.3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigated the impact of two jet fuel mandate scenarios, modeled
around the FAA renewable jet fuel goal of 1 billion gallons of renewable fuel per year by
2018 on US aviation. I identify an opportunity for the FAA goal to be implemented as
part of the RFS2, with obligated parties having a renewable volume obligation of jet fuel
each year. I find for a large range of renewable fuel price premiums (up to a $3/gallon
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premium) both mandate scenarios (1 billion and 333 million gallons of renewable jet
fuel) would have a small impact on jet fuel prices (~4% increase per year in the worst
case, 2% using current technology) with a small decrease in GHG emissions (~3% per
year in the best case). GHG emissions would continue to grow, and pass 2018 emissions
by 2022 in all but one scenario.
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Chapter 4
4 Conclusion
In this thesis, I assessed the economic impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on
US aviation between 2012 and 2020, quantified greenhouse gas abatement cost goals of
several renewable jet fuel production pathways, and estimated the impact of a
hypothetical renewable jet fuel mandate on US aviation between 2018 and 2022.
I found that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme would only have a small impact
on US airlines and emissions, and aviation operations would continue to grow by 3.11%
p.a. compared to 3.35% p.a. in a business-as-usual scenario. If carriers pass on all
additional costs to consumers, including the opportunity costs associated with free
allowances, profits for US carriers will increase by as much as 56%. Windfall gains from
free allowances may be substantial ($2.6 billion) under current allocation rules because
airlines would only have to purchase about a third of the required allowances. However,
an increase in the proportion of allowances auctioned would reduce windfall gains and
profits for US airlines may decline. If airlines pass on allowance expenses only, no
windfall gains are received, and aviation operations grow by 3.25% p.a.
For every emissions allowance that airlines purchase under the EU-ETS, a tonne
of CO 2 will be abated out-of-sector in other industries or through the Clean Development
Mechanism. In the FULL scenario, US airlines purchase approximately 71.13 million
emissions allowances. This leads to out of sector abatement of 71.13 million tonnes CO 2
in the EU between 2012 and 2020 or about a third of US airlines GHG emissions on the
North Atlantic. This can be compared to the approximately 1.6% in-sector C02
emissions reduction due largely to reductions in aviation demand under the EU-ETS. All
airlines purchase about 840 million emissions allowances which leads to the abatement of
about 840 million tonnes CO 2 between 2012 and 2020, or approximately 2% of all EU
emissions over the same period (UNFCC, 2008).
Under proposed EU legislation, airlines can use renewable jet fuel instead of
purchasing emissions allowances. I find that the current allowance price would make it
cheaper for airlines to purchase renewable jet fuel only if it has a price premium of 10
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cents per gallon or less. It is important to note that this study cannot be used to evaluate
the overall effectiveness of including aviation in the EU-ETS. In addition to considering
benefits from avoided climate damages, evaluating overall effectiveness would require
evaluating economic costs and benefits in all sectors in the economy.
In chapter 3 I found that a renewable jet fuel mandate of one billion gallons per
year from 2018 to 2022 would have a small impact on fuel price, and consequently airline
operations. This is primarily because only about 4% of fuel used by airlines would be
renewable jet fuel. For a $1.50 renewable jet fuel premium, airline fuel costs increase by
approximately 2% with abatement of between 2% and 4%. Emissions continue to grow
and reach approximate 2018 levels by 2022. Such a mandate would force the production
of renewable jet fuel and may have benefits in terms of hastening industry learning
effects, as discussed by Stern (2007). This would ultimately drive down the abatement
cost of renewable jet fuels, more rapidly than otherwise, to cost-effective levels.
I use the social cost of carbon, with a baseline value of $1 00/tCO 2e, to calculate
the societal cost-effective price premium of renewable jet fuel. I find that fuels can have a
price premium of between 40c and $1.30, depending on life cycle greenhouse gas
emissions reduction. However, the renewable jet fuels examined in this thesis, including
the only commercially available fuel, have a currently estimated price premium of more
than $2 per gallon and a calculated greenhouse gas abatement cost of more than
$250/tCO 2e. The only commercially available renewable jet fuel from hydroprocessed
animal fat currently has a $2.70 premium over conventional jet fuel and consequently a
high abatement cost at $400/tCO2 e.
This thesis shows that the emerging renewable jet fuel industry still has some way
to go to achieve greenhouse gas abatement costs, and therefore societal benefits,
comparable to the social cost of carbon. It also shows that with the fuels examined, the
EU emissions trading scheme, and the now defunct Waxman-Markey Bill, are currently
lower cost options for airlines to abate greenhouse gas than renewable jet fuel, although
they would not preclude the use of renewable fuels if they can be produced at lower cost.
Future research recommendations follow. Firstly, further research into renewable
jet fuel production cost would be beneficial in terms of accurately estimating current and
future renewable jet fuel greenhouse gas abatement cost and cost-effectiveness. Having
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additional cost data would also make estimating the impact of a renewable jet fuel
mandate more accurate. However, the next step for estimating the impact of a renewable
jet fuel mandate in the absence of more accurate cost data could be to use a probabilistic
price and life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions distributions. This would give more
informative results than the above scenario analysis.
Finally, to fully understand the cost of abatement of renewable jet fuel, the costs
should ideally be compared to the greenhouse gas abatement costs of other aviation and
economy-wide mechanisms, and ranked on a marginal abatement cost curve.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix I: Overview of Renewable Fuel Legislation in the US
Renewable fuel policy in the US is motivated by three main concerns: high fuel prices,
energy independence and security, and the environment. (Hileman, 2009, EIA, 2012 and
EISA, 2007). Between July 2000 and July 2008, Western Texas Intermediate (WTI)
crude oil prices increased by 244% (EIA, 2012), in 2010 the US imported more than two
thirds of its domestic oil consumption20 , and concerns about climate change continue to
grow.
In this appendix I explain the mechanics of the Renewable Fuels Standard II
(RFS2), as specified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, 2007).
The RFS2 has its origins in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which mandated the production
of cornstarch-based ethanol (Energy Policy Act, 2005) through the Renewable Fuels
Standard. In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act was passed. Title II of this
act, Energy Security through Increased Production of Biofuels, updated the Renewable
Fuels Standard into the renewable fuels standard II (RFS2). Under RFS2, total biofuel
production was ramped up to 36 billion gallons of biofuel per year by 2022. Cornstarch
based ethanol was capped at 15 billion gallons per year after 2015, with the majority of
growth (21 billion of the 2022 total) coming from second-generation biofuels, or
Advanced Biofuels, as shown in figure 19.
20 Domestic oil production peaked in 1969 at close to 10,000 barrels per day. Since then there has
been a steady decrease in domestic production and increase in imports. In 1994 imports of oil overtook
domestic production, and in 2007 about two thirds (66.19 percent) of US oil consumed was imported.
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Figure 18. RFS2 Schedule under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
Advanced biofuel comprises cellulosic biofuel, biomass based diesel and undifferentiated
advanced biofuel. Definitions under RFS2 are nested as shown in figure 20. This means
that ethanol from cornstarch (conventional renewable fuel) meets only it's own and the
total renewable fuel goal. Cellulosic biofuel meets its own, the advanced goal and the
total goal, biomass based diesel meets its own and the undifferentiated advanced biofuel
goals meets its own and the total goal.
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I Diagram not to scale. RFS2 schedule changes on a yearly basis. Sets under advanced bWIoelare relevant to
aviation.
2For refineries built after 2007
Figure 19. Schematic of nested RFS2 fuel categories.
The EPA enforces RFS2 by mandating obligated parties to blend ethanol with gasoline
and advanced biofuels with gasoline or diesel, depending on the distillation range of the
renewable fuel. Obligated parties are importers or producers of petroleum products
(refineries). Each obligated party is mandated a renewable volume obligation (RVO),
calculated each year and shown in equation A. 1
RVOi = (RFStd, x GVi) + Di- 1  (A.1)
where RFStdi is the renewable fuel mandate in gallons for a given fuel category from
figure 21, for calendar year i, GVi is the nonrenewable gasoline and diesel volume, which
is produced or imported by the obligated party in calendar year i in gallons and Di- 1 is
the renewable fuel deficit or carryover from the previous year in gallons.
Obligated parties are allowed to extend 20% of their RVO to the subsequent
calendar year. The EPA fines obligated parties that fail to meet their RVO. To avoid the
problem of refineries or importers not being able to procure renewable fuel for blending,
the EPA devised a system of renewable fuel credit trading using the EPA Moderated
Transaction System (EMTS), which was released for official use on July 1, 2010 (EPA,
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2012b). EMTS facilitates the transactions and trading of renewable fuel credits, known as
a Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs). A RIN is a 38-character numeric code that
is generated by the producer or importer of renewable fuel. It represents a physical
gallons of renewable fuel produced or imported in the US. The RIN code includes data
including: whether or not a RIN is assigned to a batch of fuel (1=assigned/2=unassigned)
(K), the year the batch is produced/imported (YYYY), the producing/importing company
registration information (CCCC) the production facility registration information (FFFFF)
, the producer assigned batch number (BBBBB), the equivalence value for the renewable
fuel (biodiesel is 1.5 = "15") (RR), the renewable type code (1=cellulosic ethanol/2=non
cellulosic ethanol fuel) (D), the RIN block starting number (SSSSSSSS) and the RIN
block ending number (EEEEEEEE).
The RIN system works as follows (as shown in figure 21): when renewable fuel is
produced at a plant such as Dynamic Fuels LCC in Geisther, Louisiana, a sample is sent
to the EPA for screening. The EPA determines if the fuel meets life cycle greenhouse gas
emissions targets and ASTM standards. If the fuel passes this test, each gallon is assigned
a RIN, which is registered in the EMTS system. Different types of renewable fuel
(FAME, HEFA, Ethanol etc.) are assigned different RINs, designated by the D code.
Ethanol RINs have a value of one. Other renewable fuel RINs are assigned an
equivalency value (EV) proportional to their energy content relative to ethanol, as shown
in table 9.
Fuel Category (D Code) EV
Ethanol: 1
Biodiesel (alkyl esters): 1.5
Renewable diesel: 1.7
Butanol: 1.3
Table 12. RIN equivalency values. Source (ERS, 2011).
RINs stay with the renewable fuel through the initial distribution system. When the fuel
is blended into gasoline or diesel at a refinery or importer, the RIN is then separated from
the renewable fuel. At year-end, each obligated party is required to meet its ROV by
reporting RINs to the value of their ROV, for each fuel category (D code) (ERS, 2011).
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Figure 20. Mechanics of the RFS2. Source (EPA, 2008).
For example, a refinery that produces 1 billion gallons of gasoline and 50 million
gallons of diesel in 2011, with a blend ratio of 10% for ethanol and 2% for biomass-based
diesel, needs to purchase 100 million gallons of ethanol, and 1 million gallons of biomass
based diesel in that year. The refinery would also need to meet the cellulosic biofuel goal
the advanced biofuel goal and total biofuel goal.
If a refinery is able to exactly purchase its ROV in physical gallons of renewable
fuel with attached RINs, it can report its RINs to the EPA at year-end. However, the EPA
allows obligated parties to sell RINs that have been separated from renewable fuel to
94
other refineries or registered parties, such as speculators. Therefore, if a refinery or
importer is able to purchase more renewable fuel than it needs to meet its ROV, it can
either keep the RINs for compliance for the next year (up to a maximum of 20% of its
ROV), or it can sell the RINs to other refineries or speculators. This means that refineries
or importers who are not able to procure renewable fuel can still meet their ROV by
purchasing separated RINs on the EMTS. If an obligated party is unable to meet its ROV,
it can appeal to the EPA for compliance the following year. The EPA fines noncompliant
refineries (ERS, 2011).
In certain instances, the EPA can waive renewable fuel obligations. For example,
in 2010 the EPA reduced the required volume of cellulosic biofuels from 100 million
gallons, as specified by EISA, to 5 million gallons, due to the limited production of
cellulosic biofuel. The EPA also made cellulosic biofuel waiver credits available to
obligated parties for year-end compliance at $1.56 per gallon RIN (EPA, 2010a). In 2011
the EPA reduced the required volume of cellulosic biofuels from 250 million gallons, as
specified by EISA, to 6.6 million gallons. The EPA also made cellulosic biofuel waiver
credits available to obligated parties for end-of-year compliance at $1.13 per credit (EPA,
2012a). These waiver credits cannot be used in subsequent years, or to meet either the
advanced or total renewable fuel goals.
RINs have a value, which is supposed to offset the higher production cost of
renewable fuels compared to conventional fuels. For a given mandated biofuel quantity
(for each fuel type, such as biomass based diesel) under RFS2, shown by the vertical line
(RFS2) in figure 22, the core value of the RIN is equal to the difference between the
marginal cost of production of biofuel (Ps) and the demand price (Pd).
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RFS2 s
P
P - RIN core value
Pd
D
Q, Quantity
S=Supply curve.
D=Demand curve.
RFS2=The mandated quantity.
Qe=The equilibrium quantity without the mandate.
Pe=The equilibrium price without the mandate.
P,=The supply price for biofuels at mandated quantity.
Pd=The demand price for biofuels at mandated quantity.
RIN=Renewable Identification Number.
Figure 21. Biofuel market with a binding mandate (ERS, 2011).
If the market equilibrium quantity exceeds the mandated quantity, then the RIN value
will fall to zero. If the mandated quantity exceeds the market equilibrium quantity, then
the core RIN value will be positive. The RIN value also includes transaction costs of
meeting the RFS2, and can include a speculative component (ERC, 2011). Therefore
even if a renewable fuel has an equivalent production cost relative to conventional fuel,
the RIN price could still be slightly positive (3c/RIN in the case of corn ethanol),
representing transaction costs through the EMTS and speculation (ERS, 2011). A high
RIN price represents a high per unit cost of meeting the mandate, where the total cost of
meeting a given mandate is equal to the RIN price multiplied by the mandated volume in
gallons.
The RIN market, managed under the EMTS, ensures that the RFS2 mandate is
met. Demand for RINs is generated by obligated parties who find it cheaper to purchase
separated RINs than obtaining physical renewable fuel and blending. A supply of RINs
96
comes from refineries and importers who blend more renewable fuel than their ROV, or
from non-obligated parties such as small refineries.
The core value of RINs is driven by supply and demand. If there is a shortage of
RINs to meet the total RFS2 mandated quantity, the price of RINs rise. If there is excess
supply of RINs, the RIN price falls. In theory the RIN price should be high enough to
allow biofuel producers to cover their production costs up to the RFS2 mandate. RIN
prices are also affected by other factors such as tax credits, crude oil prices, feedstock
prices and speculation.
A tax credit effectively reduces the production cost of renewable fuel, shifting the
supply curve downward in figure 22 and reducing the RIN price. An increase in crude oil
price increases the demand price, also reducing the RIN price. An increase in feedstock
prices drives up renewable fuel production costs, and so shifts the supply curve upward,
increasing the price of a RIN.
Speculation could change the quantity of RINs in the market in a given year, and
therefore increase RIN prices. For example, if speculators predict that feedstock prices
will increase in the following year, driving up the value of RINs the next year, they could
buy RINs to sell the following year. This could potentially reduce the quantity of RINs in
the market for that year, and so drive up the RIN price.
There is currently no renewable jet fuel RVO for obligated parties. Renewable jet
fuel that is currently being produced or imported into the US is being used either by the
military, or as diesel under the RFS2 (EPA, 2012c). Renewable jet fuel currently only
falls under undifferentiated advanced biofuel category. However, in the future it may fall
under cellulosic biofuel (biomass to liquid via Fischer-Tropsch fuels), or other pathways
such as sugar to jet under undifferentiated advanced biofuel.
It is conceivable that in the future the EPA would include a jet fuel RVO for
obligated parties, thereby mandating the production of renewable jet fuel. Such a
possibility is explored in Chapter 3.
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6.2 Appendix II: Cost Premium Goals
Table 13. LC-GHG emissions per Mega Joule.
Crude to conventional jet fuel
Crude to ULS jet fuel
Oil sands to jet fuel
Oil shale to jet fuel
Natural gas to F-T fuel
Coal to F-T fuel (no carbon capture)
Coal to F-T fuel (with carbon capture)
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-BO)
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-B1)
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel with CCS (LUC-
BO)
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel w/o CCS (LUC-
BI)
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-SO)
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-SI)
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-S2)
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PO)
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PI)
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P2)
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P3)
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RO)
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RI)
Jatropha oil to HRJ
Algae oil to HRJ
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HO)
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HI)
Open Pond Wet (Carter)
Flat Panel Wet (Carter)
Low
[gCO 2e/mj]
80.7
84.6
97.9
84.1
100.1
174
84.9
11.9
-4.4
12.4
6.9
27.3
81.7
498.8
22.5
32.6
153.2
665.3
39.8
78.2
31.8
14.1
30.5
-19.2
48.6
28.46
Table 14. LC-GHG emissions per gallon.
Crude to conventional jet fuel
Crude to ULS jet fuel
Oil sands to jet fuel
Oil shale to jet fuel
Natural gas to F-T fuel
Coal to F-T fuel (no carbon capture)
Coal to F-T fuel (with carbon capture)
Low
[tCO 2/gallon]
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
Baseline
[tCO 2/gallon]
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
High
[tCO2/gallon]
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
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Baseline
[gCO 2e/mj]
87.50
89.10
103.40
121.50
101.00
194.80
97.20
17.70
-2.00
56.90
53.00
37.00
97.80
564.20
30.10
39.80
166.00
698.00
54.90
97.90
39.40
50.70
47.70
5.80
56.57
28.88
High
[gCO 2e/mj]
109.30
111.20
139.00
141.00
102.40
208.00
112.60
26.00
-1.70
99.80
97.80
59.20
141.70
774.70
38.10
47.60
193.30
801.20
75.90
128.50
45.10
193.20
66.10
32.20
234.68
234.34
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-BO) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-B1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel with CCS (LUC-BO) 0.00 0.01 0.01
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel w/o CCS (LUC-B1) 0.00 0.01 0.01
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-SO) 0.00 0.00 0.01
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-S1) 0.01 0.01 0.02
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-S2) 0.06 0.07 0.10
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PO) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P1) 0.00 0.01 0.01
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P2) 0.02 0.02 0.02
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P3) 0.08 0.09 0.10
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RO) 0.01 0.01 0.01
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RI) 0.01 0.01 0.02
Jatropha oil to HRJ 0.00 0.00 0.01
Algae oil to HRJ 0.00 0.01 0.02
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HO) 0.00 0.01 0.01
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-H1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Open Pond Wet (Carter) 0.01 0.01 0.03
Flat Panel Wet (Carter) 0.00 0.00 0.03
Table 15. LC-GHG normalized to baseline conventional jet fuel.
Low LC- Baseline LC- High LC-
GHG GHG GHG
emissions emissions emissions
normalized normalized normalized
to to to
conventional conventional conventional
jet fuel jet fuel jet fuel
Crude to conventional jet fuel 0.89 1.00 1.25
Crude to ULS jet fuel 0.93 1.02 1.27
Oil sands to jet fuel 1.08 1.14 1.53
Oil shale to jet fuel 0.93 1.34 1.55
Natural gas to F-T fuel 1.10 1.11 1.13
Coal to F-T fuel (no carbon capture) 1.91 2.14 2.29
Coal to F-T fuel (with carbon capture) 0.93 1.07 1.24
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-BO) 0.13 0.19 0.29
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-B1) -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel with CCS (LUC-BO) 0.14 0.63 1.10
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel w/o CCS (LUC-B1) 0.08 0.58 1.08
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-SO) 0.30 0.41 0.65
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-Sl) 0.90 1.08 1.56
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-S2) 5.49 6.21 8.52
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PO) 0.25 0.33 0.42
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P1) 0.36 0.44 0.52
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P2) 1.69 1.83 2.13
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Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P3)
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RO)
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-Ri)
Jatropha oil to HRJ
Algae oil to HRJ
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HO)
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-Hi)
Open Pond Wet (Carter)
7.32
0.44
0.86
0.35
0.16
0.34
-0.21
0.53
7.68
0.60
1.08
0.43
0.56
0.52
0.06
0.62
8.81
0.83
1.41
0.50
2.13
0.73
0.35
2.58
Flat Panel Wet (Carter) 0.31 0.32 2.58
Table 16. Cost premium goals of low ($25/tCO 2e), medium ($100/tCO 2e) and high ($175/tCO2e) SCC.
SCC Low, Price SCC High,
LC-GHG Premium LC-GHG
High SCC Med Low
Crude to conventional jet fuel -0.07 0.00 0.23
Crude to ULS jet fuel -0.08 -0.02 0.14
Oil sands to jet fuel -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
Oil shale to jet fuel -0.16 -0.39 0.15
Natural gas to F-T fuel -0.04 -0.13 -0.20
Coal to F-T fuel (no carbon capture) -0.37 -1.31 -1.84
Coal to F-T fuel (with carbon capture) -0.07 -0.08 0.13
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-BO) 0.21 0.93 1.75
Switchgrass to F-T fuel (LUC-B1) 0.29 1.17 2.11
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel with CCS (LUC-BO) -0.03 0.43 1.74
Coal and Switchgrass to F-T fuel w/o CCS (LUC-B1) -0.02 0.48 1.86
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-SO) 0.10 0.68 1.41
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-Sl) -0.16 -0.09 0.20
Soy oil to HRJ (LUC-S2) -2.16 -5.98 -9.02
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-PO) 0.17 0.77 1.51
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P1) 0.14 0.65 1.29
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P2) -0.32 -0.95 -1.38
Palm oils to HRJ (LUC-P3) -2.25 -7.68 -12.71
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RO) 0.05 0.46 1.13
Rapeseed oil to HRJ (LUC-RI) -0.12 -0.09 0.28
Jatropha oil to HRJ 0.14 0.65 1.31
Algae oil to HRJ -0.32 0.51 1.70
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-HO) 0.08 0.55 1.34
Salicornia to HRJ and F-T Fuel (LUC-H1) 0.19 1.08 2.44
Open Pond Wet (Carter) -0.45 0.43 0.94
Flat Panel Wet (Carter) -0.45 0.78 1.38
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6.3 Appendix II: Sensitivity of GHG abatement Cost Results
Table 17. Literature Estimates Assumptions.
Delta
LC-
Economic GHG
Pathway Source Price Assumption Low Med High Source
Soy to HEFA
(feedstock 5
year average)
Soy to HEFA
(feedstock
current)
Biomass-to-
liquid via F-T
Algae Open
Pond Wet
Algae Flat
Panel Wet
Pearlson,
2011
Pearlson,
2011,
Worldban
k,
5 year average: soybean
oil price ($2.62), jet fuel
price ($2.25)
2012 for soybean oil
price 4/2012 of
$4.29/gallon
Bredehoeft, 2011
Carter, Forthcoming
Carter, Forthcoming
6500
bpd
6500
bpd
No
Feedst
ock
Cost
Stratton
4000 2000 (2010), LUC
bpd bpd SO
4000
bpd
Avera
ge
estima
te
Stratton
2000 (2010), LUC
bpd SO
High
Esti
mate
Stratton
(2010),
Carter,
Forthcomin
g
Carter,
Forthco
ming
Table 18. LC-GHG Sensitivity Results.
Lo Ave Hi Price Price Price Life cycle GHG MA M MA
w rage gh Premi Premi Premi emissions C AC C
Literature Pri Pric Pri um um um normalized to Lo Me Hig
Estimates ce e ce Low Med High conventional jet fuel w - d h +
Soy to HEFA
(feedstock 5 3.8 4.3 26. 253 58.6
year average) 0 3.98 8 1.55 1.73 2.13 0.41 41 .83 9
Soy to HEFA
(feedstock 5.5 6.3 38. 398 85.6
current) 2 5.78 6 2.44 2.70 3.28 0.41 55 .16 6
Biomass-to- 2.3 16. 707 632 771.
liquid via F-T 8 8.93 07 -0.70 5.85 12.99 0.19 .68 .05 43
106
Algae Open 5.8 18. 437 6.5 249
Pond Wet 1 7.71 54 2.73 4.63 15.46 0.62 .67 4 4.73
141 351
Algae Flat 19. 30.6 47. 5.4 6.9 213
Panel Wet 56 6 42 16.48 27.58 44.34 0.32 4 2 7.19
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